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Lessons Learned: 
 What the successes and failures of recent reform efforts tell us about the 
prospects for political reform in Illinois 
Cynthia Canary and Kent Redfield 
 
Section 1-The Need for Reform in Illinois   
 In 1972 a group of Illinois legislators and a lobbyist were indicted for taking bribes 
from Material Services Corporation to insure the passage of a bill that would help the 
company transport heavy materials on Illinois roads. In what became known as the 
“Cement Bribery Trial” four legislators, including a former Speaker of the House, and a 
lobbyist were convicted in October of 1976. Two legislators and Lester Crown, the chief 
executive of Material Services, testified against the defendants.i The company executive 
was granted immunity and not indicted, while the two legislators were sentenced under 
plea agreements. Twenty other members of the General Assembly were linked to the 
bribery scheme by testimony at the trial, but were not indicted.  
 The trial and its immediate aftermath provided a window into the political culture 
in Springfield. It was not a pretty sight. Testimony presented by the prosecution linked 
the free flow of money in the legislature explicitly and implicitly to the passage of 
specific bills. Much of the defense testimony focused on the ambiguity of the meaning of 
money given by private interests to elected public officials. When is a “campaign 
contribution” simply a campaign contribution and when it is much more? When one of 
the legislators in the case had his conviction set aside he was welcomed back by his 
colleagues with open arms. The only significant legislative response to the evidence of 
wide spread corruption in Springfield was to adopt a prohibition against state contracts 
going to individuals or corporations who had admitted in open court to bribing public 
officials, regardless of whether or not they had been indicted or convicted for the act.  
Call it “Lester Crown’s Law.” No effort was mounted after the convictions to enact 
campaign finance reform or ethics laws or to establish ethics rules or ethics committees 
within the legislature. 
 Fast forward 40 years and Illinois still continues to struggle to effectively stem 
corruption. Three Illinois Governors - Kerner (1973), Ryan (2006) and Blagojevich 
(2011) - were convicted of charges related to public corruption and sentenced to prison. 
An Illinois attorney general, the state’s chief law enforcement officer, was convicted and 
sentenced to prison on charges related to public corruption in 1991. More than a dozen 
4 
 
sitting or former state legislators have been indicted on charges related to public 
corruption with 10 convictions. In addition, two members of Congress from Illinois were 
convicted of public corruption charges during that time.ii 
 Corruption has not been the province of elected officials alone. A scheme to 
bribe agency officials to fix a state contract resulted in the conviction in 1998 of two 
company officials and two officials in the Department of Public Aid. The 2006 conviction 
of Governor George Ryan grew out of an investigation of the Secretary of State’s Office 
which revealed the systematic selling of commercial driver’s licenses, the conversion of 
bribe money into campaign contributions, and a massive diversion of employees and 
resources from the operation of the Secretary of State’s office to the 1998 Ryan 
campaign for Governor. Named “Operation Safe Roads” by the US Attorney’s office, the 
investigation resulted in 75 convictions or guilty pleas in addition to the conviction of the 
Governor. The Blagojevich indictment grew out of “Operation Board Games”, an 
investigation by the US Attorney’s office into corruption in state pension boards and 
state hiring. In addition to the conviction of the former Governor, the investigation also 
resulted in a number of convictions, including Democratic Chicago insider and fixer 
Tony Rezko and William Cellini, a legendary Republican power broker from Springfield.  
 It is the same story at the local level. In the past 40 years, thirty Chicago 
Aldermen have been convicted of public corruption. Scandals within Chicago and Cook 
County have been so numerous that you need a scorecard to keep track: Operation 
Graylord (corruption in Cook County Courts,1980-1992), Operation Incubator (parking 
ticket and water bill collection, 1984-1989), Operation Gambat (organized crime 
connection to 1st Ward political organizations, 1986-1997), Operation Silver Shovel 
(landfill permit, 1992- 2001),Operation Haunted Hall (ghost payrolling, 1993-1999), 
Operation Family Secrets (organized crime and law enforcement, 2000-2009), 
Operation Hired Truck (contracts for private hauling, 2004-2009), and Operation 
Crooked Code (bribery for zoning permits, 2006-2009).iii 
 What those outside Illinois refer to as the “Chicago way” or Chicago-style politics 
is really a way of thinking about and practicing politics that is the essence of the 
dominant political culture in Illinois. Following Illinois Secretary of State Paul Powell’s 
death in 1970 almost $900,000 in cash was found in his hotel room in Springfield, some 
of it in shoe boxes in a closet. The money in the shoe boxes has become one of the 
most enduring symbols of corruption in Illinois politics. Powell, the gray fox of Vienna, 
learned his politics in deep southern Illinois, about as far away as you can get from the 
Chicago loop and still be in Illinois.iv George Ryan was a product of Kankakee County 
where the politics differed from Chicago machine politics only in its location.v Recent 
history of political corruption in suburban Illinois tells a similar tale. For example, in 2001 
the mayor of Calumet City was convicted of taking bribes and misappropriation of public 
funds. In 2002, the mayor of Cicero was convicted of public corruption in a mob related 
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theft of $12 million dollars from the city’s insurance fund. The pattern is as familiar as it 
is disheartening.vi 
 In 2012, Illinois political corruption made national news, again. First, Derrick 
Smith, an Illinois legislator from Chicago, was indicted in March after being caught on 
tape accepting a bribe. What elevated the story above run-of-the-mill political corruption 
was the fact that Smith won the Democratic primary election shortly after being indicted.  
When Smith refused calls for him to withdraw from the ballot, the Illinois House of 
Representatives formed a special committee and initiated an investigation. That process 
culminated in Smith being expelled from the legislature in mid-August. In spite of being 
thrown out of office for the current term, only a felony conviction would keep him off the 
ballot in the fall. A trial before November is not likely. He could win his seat back, but to 
do so he will have to beat the independent candidate recruited by the Democratic Party 
to run against him. There is no Republican candidate on the ballot. While some have 
joked that the ethical standard one must meet to run for public office in Illinois is “not 
currently under indictment,” it appears even that may be setting the bar too high. 
 The second incident of Illinois political corruption to make the national news in 
2012 occurred in the boyhood home of former President Ronald Reagan, Dixon Illinois. 
In April federal agents arrested the city treasurer for embezzling city funds. Not a unique 
story, in Illinois or elsewhere. Except for one fact, the fact that the treasurer stands 
accused of stealing over $53 million over 21 years.  That figure represents almost one-
third of the receipts of the city’s general fund during the period.  
 Looking back over 40 years it appears that if ever a state had a flat learning 
curve when it comes to preventing political corruption, that state is Illinois. By any 
quantitative or qualitative measure, the magnitude and persistence of political corruption 
in Illinois is stunning. It has become an essential part of Illinois’ identity, defining our 
state and our politics. And it takes a terrible toll on the lives of our citizens. 
 Why is Illinois so corrupt?vii 
 Political corruption falls into three broad areas of illegal or unethical activities. 
First, there is corruption that directly subverts the political process. Buying votes or 
trying to intimidate specific groups to keep them from voting are examples. Second, 
there is corruption that results in public resources being used for political purposes. 
Examples are putting an unqualified political supporter on the public payroll or requiring 
public employees to perform campaign work while on public time. Finally, there is 
corruption that results in using public authority for private gain. Public officials extorting 
money or taking bribes from private firms seeking government contracts is an example 
of this type of corruption.  
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 On all levels, Illinois has a long history of public corruption. The question is why. 
Why is politics in Illinois so corrupt? Do we just have a lot of bad people? Do we have a 
political system that corrupts many of the people who get involved with politics? Or is it 
something in the water? The answer is all of the above. The basic political culture that 
every Illinoisan grows up with and experiences firsthand contributes to a climate of 
political corruption. Our political culture does little to attract good people to politics and 
even less to restrain the bad people who get into politics. The political system we have 
developed in Illinois reflects and reinforces the corruption of our political culture. 
 Commonly shared attitudes and beliefs shape what we expect from politics and 
politicians. Illinois has a political culture that emphasizes power, winning, control, and 
jobs over public interest or good public policy. Illinoisans tend to think of politics as 
primarily a business, a vocation people take up in order to pursue personal interests. 
Not only are we taught at our dinner tables, in our classrooms and churches, and 
through the news media that politics is a business, we also learn that it is a dirty 
business. We expect that politicians will cut corners in order to win and that they will 
place the interests of themselves and those who supported them above the interests of 
the general public. For those inside the process, politics is regarded as the province of 
professional politicians rather than concerned citizens. These attitudes translate into low 
expectations about politics, along with a tolerance for corruption, a lack of incentives for 
citizens to participate in the process, rules governing elections which favor entrenched 
interests and incumbent office holders, and an acceptance of patronage as a fact of life 
in hiring for government jobs. Political scientists call this type of political culture 
“individualistic.”  Illinois has long been the poster child for individualistic politics.viii Our 
expectations and our standards for politics are very low and our politicians live up to 
them.  
 The political structures that have developed and the types of politicians that have 
dominated Illinois since statehood tend to favor the interests of the politicians and 
private interests over the interests of the general public. Illinois election laws discourage 
easy access and widespread participation in the process. Access to public documents, 
while greatly enhanced by recent changes in the law, is still too limited and often 
discouraged by those who have the responsibility to administer the law. Public 
disclosure of the official actions and private interests of public officials is limited in both 
content and access.  
 Before 2011, there were no limits on how much a person, association, company 
or union could contribute directly to a political candidate. There are still no limits on the 
direct contributions made by political parties or legislative leaders in a general election. 
There are no prohibitions against campaign contributions from business and 
professional interests that are regulated by the state. Direct contributions from corporate 
entities are prohibited by federal law and by a majority of the states, but not in Illinois. 
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The elections of judges from the State Supreme Court on down takes place under rules 
of the general campaign finance system which allows corporations, unions and interest 
groups to contribute directly to judicial candidates.  
 Prohibitions against economic relationships between public officials and private 
interests that might compromise public actions exist only in the broadest sense. Illinois 
has long had freedom of information and open meeting laws that promote transparency 
in government, but enforcing them and making them meaningful is a constant battle. In 
spite of laws and court rulings to the contrary, political patronage still influences hiring 
by state agencies and local governments. 
 Illinois’ political culture and political processes do not encourage talented, public 
service-oriented people to get involved with politics or to make state government a 
career. If anything, it discourages those people. At the same time, the unscrupulous and 
the ambitious use the political system to pursue their individual goals while the weak are 
easily corrupted by the excesses. 
What are the costs of political corruption? 
 There are costs to widespread public corruption in Illinois that go beyond the 
money spent on criminal investigations and trials. The first is the loss of the legitimacy 
of the political process for the citizens of the state. Real corruption destroys public 
support for the political system. But the appearance of corruption can be just as 
corrosive to the legitimacy of the political system as actual corruption. If everyone 
believes Illinois politics is corrupt, there is no reason for the general public to accept the 
policies or programs of government as having authority or to assume they have value. If 
everyone believes that all Illinois politicians are corrupt, or become corrupt soon after 
they take office, then there is no reason to support attempts by political leaders to 
promote individual responsibility or collective obligations to solve the state’s social and 
economic problems or provide care for those in need.  
 The second cost of political corruption is a loss of participation. Participation in 
politics is part of a civic culture that develops and ennobles both individuals and society. 
Individuals and society are both better when people participate in the political process. 
When citizens share in the decision-making and have a vested interest in the outcomes, 
the foundations of the political system are strong. A corrupt political system does not 
encourage participation, nor does one where politics is reserved for the professional 
politician. When there is a widespread perception that politics is corrupt and someone 
else’s business, the pool of citizens that participate in elections and seeks to influence 
policy grows smaller and creates a void that entrenched interests are all too happy to 
fill. Both the state and individual citizens lose when a corrupt political system limits 
political participation. 
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 The third cost is a weakened talent pool of public officials and those who work for 
government. A corrupt political system does not encourage young people to engage in 
politics or make government a career. If there is a widespread perception that 
patronage hires and political interference make it difficult for talented people without 
political connections to get state jobs or to do a professional job of delivering services, 
then people will not become involved in government. As a result, the pool of those who 
want to get involved with government as a career keeps shrinking in quantity and 
quality. 
 The final cost to political corruption is the deterioration of the quality of the public 
services provided by state and local government. Do-nothing state jobs, make-work 
jobs, and inflated no-bid contracts take resources away from doing the real job of state 
and local government. A lack of highly qualified people and the diversion of public 
resources to political or private ends make meeting the basic obligations of government 
in the areas of education, health and welfare increasingly more difficult. Because our 
political culture is status quo oriented and risk adverse, it discourages the kinds of policy 
innovations and risk taking that leads to improved ways of addressing the state’s needs 
and obligations. 
What needs to be done? 
 Unlike most states, Illinois implemented little reform in the post-Watergate era. 
However by the late 1990’s, Illinois propensity for scandal became so exaggerated that 
simply blaming corruption on bad actors was no longer viable. 
 In response in part to a political corruption scandal during Governor Edgar’s 
second term, Illinois passed a new ethics and campaign finance disclosure law in 1998. 
Five years later in response to separate scandals that brought down Governor Ryan, 
and ultimately sent House GOP Chief of Staff Mike Tristano to jail, Illinois passed a new 
ethics law under the leadership of Governor Blagojevich. The new law established 
ethics commissions for the executive and legislative branches and inspectors general to 
investigate complaints, required ethics training for all state employees, tightened gift-
giving to public officials, prohibited state employees involved in negotiating large state 
contracts from taking jobs with those companies, and provided increased access to 
lobbyist registration and economic interest statements. In 2008 in response to the 
political corruption scandal rapidly escalating around Governor Blagojevich, the Illinois 
legislature passed over the Governor’s veto a law prohibiting pay-to-play actions in state 
government. In 2009 in response to the indictment and subsequent impeachment of 
Governor Blagojevich, Illinois passed a series of new laws that placed new regulations 
on state purchasing and contracts, reformed the Freedom of Information Act, and 
placed limits on most campaign contributions while expanding disclosure requirements 
and strengthening enforcement. 
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 In light of recent legislative success, do we really need more laws? And even 
more fundamentally, do laws really matter? Won’t bad people do bad things in spite of 
the law? On one level, the solution lies in identifying the bad people and enforcing 
existing laws. Stealing public funds, engaging in fraud, taking bribes, and using public 
office to extort money has always been illegal in Illinois and everywhere else in the 
country.  
 Having said that, the fact remains that laws do matter and new laws can make a 
difference. Laws define what is legal and illegal. They set the tone for what society 
considers acceptable behavior and allow us to draw a line in the sand. However, there 
can be a lot of gray area around that line with far too many viewing the law as a ceiling 
rather than a floor on acceptable behavior. For example, look at way the gift ban law 
was constructed in 1998. In general a gift ban prohibits people who could benefit from 
the actions of a public official from giving anything of value to those officials. These 
kinds of exchanges invite both real corruption (bribery and extortion) and the 
appearance of corruption (by creating conflicts of interest). Rather than police these 
exchanges on a case by case basis, a gift ban prohibits them. The original gift ban law 
had a blanket exemption for “food and beverages consumed on the premises.” In plain 
language, lobbyists could spend an unlimited amount of money on “wining and dining” 
legislators. A limit of $75 per day was added by the 2003 changes in the law. But the 
fact remains that a lobbyist can legally buy $75 worth of food and beverages for a 
legislator in a restaurant, but the lobbyist cannot legally buy the same food and 
beverages at a grocery store and drop it off at the legislator’s home. The message the 
law sends to participants and to the general public about political ethics is far from clear.  
 In Wisconsin, a lobbyist cannot buy as much as a cup of coffee for a legislator. 
There is a bright-line, zero-tolerance policy. The assumption is that, just as there is no 
such thing as being a little bit pregnant, there is no such thing as being a little bit 
corrupt. Unlike Illinois, the ethical message of the Wisconsin law is clear. 
 There are actions beyond throwing the bad people in jail that would result in 
major improvements to the ethical climate in Illinois politics. Key changes in the laws 
that govern Illinois politics would significantly reduce both actual corruption and the 
appearance of corruption. In general, these involve hardening the target, making 
governmental actions and information more transparent, regulating and limiting the roles 
that money plays in elections and policy making, and raising the ethical standards and 
expectations of public officials and the general public in Illinois. Hardening the target 
means making it more difficult and more risky for individuals to engage in political 
corruption. Transparency means making political actions and processes and information 
about government and political actors more open and accessible and corruption more 
visible. Regulating and limiting the role of money in elections and policy making means 
enacting better disclosure, prohibitions on contributions from corporate entities, 
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comprehensive limits on contributions, and public finance and small donor systems. 
Raising expectations means convincing the public and politicians that standards of 
ethics need to be higher in politics and government than in any other sphere of human 
activity because politics and government, ultimately, are the public’s business. 
How to get there 
 While the general goals of reform are widely accepted, the same consensus 
does not exist as to the specific policy changes and actions needed to achieve those 
goals. Even when there is agreement about what needs to change, change is often 
elusive. This is particularly true in Illinois, since the road to change often goes through 
the Legislative leaders and the Governor.  Passing laws aimed at political reform and 
fighting corruption means challenging the status quo and changing the rules of the 
game. People who hold political power in Illinois achieved success under the existing 
ethics, public official and lobbyist disclosure, campaign finance, election code, and 
transparency laws. They have learned how to use their resources to win or to reduce 
their losses playing a familiar and often predictable game. A new set of rules at a 
minimum means relearning how to be successful. New rules often provide temporary, 
new partisan advantages and disadvantages and alter the value of existing resources. 
New rules can produce unintended consequences that further increase the uncertainty 
of political actions. For all of these reasons, the status quo is a political system’s default 
position when it comes to efforts to enact political reform, even in a political culture 
which is disposed toward a public interest, common good framework for the process of 
politics.  Because Illinois’ political culture is not so disposed, the task of enacting reform 
is exceptionally difficult. 
 But change does happen in Illinois. Reform measures do get enacted into law. 
Why? Why do some reform efforts succeed and some fail? With the need so great and 
the hurdles so high, understanding how to maximize the effectiveness of efforts to enact 
political reform and communicating that knowledge is critical to the continued success of 
those efforts. Answering the question of what works and why requires unpacking and 
articulating the strategies and techniques that constitute best practices for establishing a 
public agenda for reform and then translating that agenda into public policy.  In “Section 
2 – Different roads to reform” we will examine in broad terms, the different approaches 
that have been used in Illinois to promote or enact political reform. In “Section 3 - The 
struggle for reform” we will construct a time line of successful reform measures over the 
past three decades and present four case studies of successful reform efforts: the 1998 
gift ban law, the 2003 ethics law, the 2007 pay-to-play law and the 2009 campaign 
finance law.  These lay the foundation for the next section. In “Section 4-Lessons 
learned” we will draw on those case studies to set out the factors, strategies, and 
techniques that define the parameters of reform efforts and constitute best practices for 
those seeking to enact reform in Illinois. In the final section, “Section 5 – Fighting the 
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next war,” we turn our attention to the future by examining how the traditional reform 
agenda can be shaped to reflect the limitations and opportunities that we see for 
achieving lasting political reform in Illinois politics. 
 
Section 2 - Different Roads to Reform in Illinois     
 The history of Illinois politics and government is not a history of political reform. 
However, in spite of the overall picture, purposeful, conscious changes have been 
accomplished in the way we practice and think about politics and the proper functioning 
of government. Political reform does occur in Illinois from time to time. The specific 
roads taken to reform have been as diverse as they have been numerous. Some of 
these changes have come through litigation, some through citizen movements, some 
through the efforts of watchdog groups and the news media, some through lobbying 
efforts that have led to change in Illinois laws, and some through the filtering down of 
cultural and social changes in society. Some reforms have emerged not for public policy 
reasons, but to punish political opponents or capture a partisan or a political advantage. 
Given that creating legislation can be like sausage making, it often is not easy to 
untangle the strands of a bill that advances the public’s interest from those designed to 
advance narrow political interests.  
Litigation 
 Illinois has a long and well-deserved reputation as a patronage or “job” state. 
“Boss” Daley, as Chicago’s mayor from 1955-1976 was known, and his patronage army 
are an enduring symbol of Illinois politics. Former Governor Rod Blagojevich learned his 
politics from his father-in-law, Dick Mell, who is a Chicago Alderman and Ward 
Committeeman. While the national news media makes reference to Chicago-style 
politics when discussing Illinois’ political and financial problems, patronage is not just a 
Chicago phenomenon. In state government, since statehood, patronage politics has 
flourished under Democratic and Republican Governors alike.ix Downstate politics 
produced former Governor George Ryan from Kankakee County and the legendary 
Paul Powell from Vienna. Those familiar with the state’s history know that patronage 
politics has been a staple of Illinois politics regardless of region, party, or the level of 
government. 
 While the death of patronage in Illinois state and local government has been 
greatly exaggerated, it does not dominate government employment processes the way 
it once did. The US Supreme Court is responsible for much of that change. Two of the 
most important court decisions prohibiting the use of political affiliation as the sole 
criteria for employment decisions made by governmental bodies originated in Illinois. 
The Elrod decision (Elrod v. Burns 1976) held that governmental employees could not 
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be fired because they supported a political party different from the person who had the 
power to hire and fire public employees. Richard Elrod was an elected Cook County 
Sheriff who fired people who had been hired by his Republican predecessor. The Court 
held that such actions violated the individual’s right of speech and association. The US 
Supreme Court applied the same logic in the Rutan decision (Rutan v. Republican Party 
of IL 1990), when it held unconstitutional the use of political considerations by the 
administration of Illinois Governor Jim Thompson in making employment decisions 
involving hiring, promotions, and transfers.  
 These court decisions have had an impact, but they are not the only factors at 
work responsible for shrinking Illinois’ patronage system. For example, there is some 
degree of irony that public employee collective bargaining, which is widely blamed in 
some media and policy circles for much of the fiscal problems of local and state 
governments, has been a major factor in decreasing patronage in Illinois. Given the 
opportunity, many public employees have formed or joined bargaining units, seeking 
protection from patronage and the capriciousness of Illinois politics and budget 
problems. 
 Overall the situation has improved, but the residual impact of the political culture  
is still present. Hiring by the City of Chicago and Cook County are still regulated by 
1972 and 1983 federal consent decrees and a federal monitor appointed in 2005. The 
“Shakman decrees” and monitor are the result of a federal law suit filed by Michael 
Shakman challenging patronage hiring practices. This is not unlike how some southern 
states and other areas in 2012 still operate under restrictions from Section 5 of the 
federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires preclearance before implementing 
changes to voting practices.  
 The Illinois Campaign for Political Reform has been involved with a number of 
law suits, both as a plaintiff against the Illinois State Board of Elections seeking 
enforcement of Illinois law and through amicus briefs in state and federal cases litigating 
Illinois campaign finance laws. The best source of information and support in writing and 
litigating campaign finance law at the state level is the Brennan Center for Justice at 
New York University School of Law. They publish a number of very useful materials in 
this area.x 
 Litigation as a strategy for achieving political reform is most effective when the 
actions in question violate the Federal or state constitutions or violate a state or federal 
statute. Litigation is rarely a viable option when faced with bad policy or the absence of 
policy to address corruption and unethical behavior in government. Nor is litigation a 
strategy which can be entered into without substantial resources or a significant pro 
bono commitment from attorneys.  
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Citizen Initiatives 
 Citizen initiatives have been a well-travel road to reform in states whose 
constitutions allow them. The most recent Illinois State Constitution adopted in 1970 
provided only a limited opportunity for citizen initiatives. Specifically, Article 14, Section 
3 provides only for citizen initiatives limited to the structural and procedural subjects 
contained in legislative article of the constitution. Citizen initiatives on matters of public 
policy are not allowed.xi 
 In 1975, current Illinois Governor Patrick Quinn and the Coalition for Political 
Honesty mounted a petition drive to place an initiative on the 1976 general election 
ballot that would ban legislative double-dipping (holding more than one government 
job), prohibit conflict of interest voting by legislators, and bar legislators from receiving 
their annual salary in advance. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld a challenge to the 
initiative on the grounds that the subject matter was outside the narrow criteria set out in 
the state constitution.  In 1979 The Coalition organized a new petition drive to amend 
the state constitution. This initiative, which was initiated after wide spread public outrage 
over a post-election legislative pay raise, was titled the Cutback Amendment. It reduced 
by one third the size of the House in the General Assembly and eliminated the system 
of cumulative voting that was used to select those Representatives. The initiative 
withstood legal challenges and was place on the 1980 general election ballot. It passed 
with 69 percent of the vote. 
 Three subsequent efforts to use the initiative process in the Illinois State 
Constitution to enact substantive or procedural reforms were unsuccessful.  All three 
were ordered off the ballot after legal challenges. Given very narrow way the Illinois 
Supreme Court has interpreted the initiative language in the Illinois Constitution, most 
consider this road to reform largely a dead end, although one exception may be the 
legislative redistricting process. 
Criminal Prosecutions 
 Political corruption often involves clearly illegal acts. Bribery, extortion, theft, and 
fraud are already illegal. When evidence of political corruption results in investigations 
and criminal indictments, the public process of identifying bad actors and bringing them 
to justice is another road to reform. The list of convictions of state and local public 
officials and private citizens for political corruption in recent history is truly impressive - 
both in terms of quantity and quality. Getting rid of bad apples does stop specific acts of 
corruption. Seeing people go to jail can make others think twice about violating the law. 
But how effective legal action is against political corruption in the long run depends on 
whether the bad apples are aberrations in a basically sound political system or 
14 
 
symptomatic of problems and pressures that can’t be resolved by periodic high profile 
criminal prosecutions. 
 If stopping political corruption was primarily a matter of providing sufficient 
disincentives, you would think that having a former Governor arrested and sent to jail for 
political corruption would make it less likely that the next Governor would get arrested 
and sent to jail for political corruption. But that was not the case. You would think that 
having a Governor caught on tape discussing payoffs would make it less likely that a 
state legislator would get caught on tape taking a bribe. But that was not the case 
either. The situation at the local level is no different from that at the state level. The 
never-ending parade of local government officials from Chicago and other areas of the 
state going off to jail has not resulted in a moratorium on political corruption at the local 
level. Aggressive prosecution of political corruption is a necessary but not sufficient road 
to reform. 
The News Media and Watchdog and Public Interest Groups 
 Not all unethical political behavior rises to the level of illegal acts. Even when it 
does, the chance of a successful prosecution may be slight. Conflicts between the 
interests of the supporters of political officials and the interests of constituents or the 
general public can result in corruption or the appearance of corruption. Investigative 
reporting and research by news organizations and public interest groups can bring 
political favors, sweetheart contracts, political pressure, nepotism, and patronage to the 
attention of the general public and force public officials to address the questions they 
raise. In addition to illuminating public problems and political scandals, these groups 
make a critical contribution by aggregating public data and then systematically 
analyzing that data. Accurate, objective data on public actions - contracts, jobs, 
campaign contributions and expenditures, expenditures of public funds, lobbyist 
registration, etc. – provides a foundation for policy discussions by establishing a 
baseline grounded in facts. Illinois has a long and rich history of watchdog groups such 
as the Better Government Association (BGA) and Common Cause who play an 
essential role in bring scandal and corruption to light and promoting changes that will 
make corruption less likely or easier to detect. Illinois also has long history of muck 
raking investigative reporting that exposes and publicizes political corruption. This is 
true for all types of news media in all regions of the state.  
 A vigilant press and effective public interest and watchdog groups can lessen 
both corruption and the appearance of corruption. Public officials and those who seek to 
influence government will modify current and future behavior to avoid the 
embarrassment of negative news stories, editorials, and reports. These reports also 
document the magnitude and the scope of the problems. One fixed contract is a story of 
individual greed and weakness. Scores of stories about fixed contracts throughout the 
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state suggest a larger problem of the absence of proper procedures and oversight or an 
ethical weakness in our expectations for political behavior.  While they play a critical role 
in fighting public corruption, these groups can destroy their credibility or contribute to an 
exaggerated level of public cynicism through over-hyped or inaccurate news stories or 
investigative reports. And, as with criminal prosecutions, the activities of the news 
media and watchdog and public interest groups cannot reform a political system with 
systemic weaknesses or reshape a political culture by themselves. They are necessary 
for creating a climate that is receptive to political reform and necessary to sustain 
political reform, but they are not sufficient to achieve it in isolation. 
Enacting New Laws   
 The most direct way to reform the political system is by changing the formal rules 
of the game. Enacting new laws to prohibit or modify behaviors is a critical road to 
reform. It is also often the most difficult. A strong foundation of aggressive law 
enforcement, tenacious  news reporting and editorial opinion and engaged, effective 
watchdog and public interest groups greatly facilitates efforts to enact new laws to 
address deficiencies in the system.  
 News stories and reports uncovering political corruption, revealing the resistance 
of those in government to granting unfettered access to public documents, and 
exposing the corrupting influence of money on elections and policy making only gets 
you so far. Even prosecutions and convictions for bribes, shake-downs and influence 
peddling cannot make up for the absence of the regulation, limitations, oversight and 
transparency necessary to reduce political corruption or overcome attitudes of cynicism 
and disengagement among members of the public. Real reform requires a new set of 
rules and a new narrative about the standards and obligations of public officials and 
citizens. 
 Enacting political reform through legislation is difficult because those who have 
power and benefit from the status quo must relent and change the basic rules of the 
game. Political reform always carries risks for those with power. It can upset a stable 
equilibrium and cause unforeseen consequences. It creates an uncertain future where 
the benefits of reform may or may not occur. It challenges the assumption that problems 
and short comings within the political system come from the actions of bad individuals 
and the failure of institutional structures to work properly. Assertions that our political 
culture and the design of our political institutions attracts bad people to politics and 
corrupts good people are not received warmly by those who have achieved power and 
success under status quo. Neither are assertions that bad behavior and bad policy are 
not the result of the system breaking down, but are the result of the political system 
working the way it was designed.  
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Changing the Political Culture 
 Culture is learned behavior. We learn values, attitudes, and beliefs about how the 
world works, what the rules are, what is acceptable and what is not, and what is 
important, fair, and just from our parents, friends, schools, religious institutions, news 
media, and life experiences. Cultural values are a very powerful force in human society.  
How do you reduce bank robberies? You certainly make robbing banks a crime. You 
also install security systems and hire guards. You make every effort to apprehend and 
convict bank robbers and send them to prison. All of this will reduce bank robberies. But 
most people do not rob banks because it is hard or because you could get caught. Most 
people do not rob banks because they believe it is wrong. Honesty is a basic cultural 
value. That does not mean that people will not rob banks or that we should not take 
every measure to keep them from doing so. But the best protection against bank 
robbery is a shared value of honestly. 
 The ultimate goal of political reform from a cultural standpoint is to create a way 
of thinking about and behaving in politics which reflects ethical values and a 
commitment to democratic self-government. We need to insure that our citizens and 
public officials internalize values of honesty and ethical behavior on behalf of the public 
good. This requires a number of factors. Investment in civic education and building a 
civic culture which promote citizen engagement are critical.  Bringing attention to 
corruption and conflicts of interest, prosecuting illegal behavior, and enacting new laws 
all work to modify political culture if the lessons are about the nature and values of the 
political system rather than just about bad people and institutional failures. Changes in 
political culture in turn facilitate efforts to draw attention to the need for political reform 
and stimulate efforts to enact new laws. The change can be cumulative in a positive 
direction in contrast to a downward spiral of public disengagement fed by corruption and 
cynicism. 
 There are alternative futures. After former Governor George Ryan was convicted 
on public corruption charges, a number of observers commented that his biggest 
mistake was that he was an old style politician who had not changed with the times. His 
failure to change resulted in him going to jail for behavior that used to be acceptable (or 
at least not prosecuted), but now was no longer tolerated by society. There is some 
truth in this. Attitudes toward corruption and the willingness to prosecute corruption had 
changed. And the laws that were passed in response to this political scandal further 
changed the political culture. The road to political reform begins and ends with political 
culture. 
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 While the forces for change can operate in isolation, they are not mutually 
exclusive. Often they reinforce each other. Watchdog groups and the news media shine 
the light of public scrutiny on public problems and political scandals.  At other times 
political corruption is exposed through criminal indictments. Public interest groups 
provide the data and analysis necessary to document and frame these problems and 
scandals as systemic weaknesses rather than isolated aberrations. Once in the public 
arena and on the public agenda, resolution can come from criminal convictions, 
litigation or enacting new laws. Successful resolution leads to changes in the way public 
officials and citizens think about and practice politics. One step does not always lead to 
another. These are different spheres of activity that interact and intersect. 
 
Section 3 - The Struggle for Reform in Illinois: Changing Laws and Culture 
 Part A) A Time Line of Reform 
 The history of political reform in Illinois suggests that changes in the status quo 
have been neither liner nor cumulative. Change takes place sporadically. It has been 
driven by a variety of factors: traumatic national events, political scandals, the resolve 
and leadership of an elected official, social movement, and the news media. However it 
happens, it rarely comes quickly or easily. Reform is not in the state’s political DNA.  
 Open meetings and access to public records are keys to transparency in 
government. Illinois’ open meetings law was passed in 1957. It was one of the first and 
one of the most comprehensive of such laws to be adopted at the state level. In 
contrast, Illinois was the last state in the nation to adopt a comprehensive law granting 
public access to public records when the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) became 
law in 1984.xii Why a 27-year hiatus in the movement toward transparency and 
accountability in government? The most likely explanation is that the slowness to 
embrace FOIA is what you would expect from a risk-adverse, status quo oriented, 
individualistic political culture. All of this makes the adoption of an open meeting law in 
1957 in the face of the politics of the time a tribute to the values, determination, and 
political skills of its author, the late US Senator Paul Simon. 
 The failure of the Illinois legislature to redistrict the House prior to the 1964 
election led to a court ordered at-large election for the 177 members of the House. The 
result was a huge Democratic majority reflecting the landslide election result at the 
national level. There was also a major turnover in the members of the House. Among 
those new representatives was a group of progressive, reform-minded legislators who 
would not have been elected but for the at-large election. The next six years saw a 
number of significant reforms, most notably the passage of the State Governmental 
Ethics Act in 1967 and the establishment of the Commission on the Operation of the 
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General Assembly (COGA) in 1965xiii. The Commission’s report led to the adoption of 
significant procedural reforms that modernized the legislature and provided 
transparency and access for the general public. 
 A new state constitution was adopted in 1970. That document mandated for the 
first time the filing of statements of economic interest – or information about their own 
personal interests – by public officials under procedures created by state law. The 
requirements and procedures for filing these statements were added to the State 
Governmental Ethics Act. The 1970 State Constitution also created the Office of Auditor 
General and mandated the auditing of state public funds. The Auditor General is elected 
for a ten-year term by a 3/5 vote of each chamber and may be removed only for cause 
by the same vote.  The result was the institutionalization of strong, independent office 
which provides transparency and accountability in state government. 
 The national scandal leading to President Richard Nixon’s resignation ushered in 
the post-Watergate era of the mid-1970s. During this period new campaign finance 
reform and ethics laws were enacted at the federal level and in almost every state. 
Many of those laws severely regulated campaign contributions and campaign 
expenditures. Most of those laws had to be rewritten after 1976 when the US Supreme 
Court in Buckley v. Valeo nullified restrictions on campaign expenditures.  
 The campaign finance law that Illinois adopted in 1974 did not have to be 
rewritten. The Illinois General Assembly had grudgingly passed a law requiring the 
reporting and disclosure of campaign contributions. No restrictions of any kind were 
placed on contributions or expenditures. The law would remain essentially unchanged 
until 1990 when candidates and political committees were required to file reports of 
contributions and expenditure every six months rather than once a year.xiv 
 Illinois also adopted a new lobbyist registration law in 1973. While it was not a 
very effective law, it remained largely unchanged for the next 20 years. In 1993 the law 
was significantly revised, providing much greater application and coverage. However, it 
still lacked effective enforcement mechanisms. This reform effort had an unlikely 
champion – Secretary of State George Ryan. Administering the lobbyist registration law 
was one of the duties of the Secretary of State. With an eye toward higher office, Ryan, 
who was generally seen as the quintessential insider and an old-style politician, was 
anxious to raise his visibility and improve his image among voters. Leading the effort to 
strengthen the lobbyist registration law was smart politics for Ryan. It was also very 
useful to those pushing reform to have the support of an insider who had credibility and 
clout with those directly affected by the change. The next significant change in the 
lobbyist registration law would come in 2003 in the wake of the political corruption 
scandal that drove Governor Ryan from office. It was part of an ethics proposal pushed 
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by another statewide elected official trying to establish his credentials as a reformer, 
newly elected Governor Rod Blagojevich. 
 The 1980s was a quiet decade for reform in Illinois. The legislature passed a bill 
that would have established a public finance system for state political campaigns in 
1983, but Governor Jim Thompson killed it with a veto. Thompson did sign the Freedom 
of Information Law in 1984. Patronage also began to crumble in the 1980’s. Following 
the 1976 Elrod decision, the US Supreme Court handed down the Rutan decision in 
1990. As previously noted, Rutan vs. Republican Party of Illinois prohibited the kind of 
patronage practices that had long been an essential part of public employment in 
Illinois. After a quiet decade in the 1980’s, the next two decades would rival the late 
1960s and 1970s as a period of substantial political reform in Illinois. 
 In 1997 and 1998 significant campaign finance and ethics reform proposals were 
signed into law in Illinois. The impetus for change came from a growing body of data on 
the role of money in Illinois which was developed by academic and news media 
projects, a campaign finance task force headed by US Senator Paul Simon and former 
Governor William Stratton, and a bribery and influence buying scandal involving the 
administration of Governor Jim Edgar and the legislature. The push for campaign 
finance reform and ethics legislation had greater visibility and momentum than any time 
since 1974.  
 The first legislative response to the increased visibility of the troubling role of 
money in politics was largely a defensive reaction, particularly to proposals calling for 
the adoption of contribution limits. Focusing on disclosure as an alternative to 
contribution limits, the legislature passed a bill that provided for voluntary electronic 
filing of campaign committee reports with the State Board of Election. It required the 
Board to post all reports filed by political committees in a searchable data base 
accessible through the Internet. The bill also abolished the requirement that anyone 
who wanted to view a report from a campaign committee provide personal contact and 
biographical information that was then forwarded to the committee. 
 The following year, hoping to capitalize on the momentum for reform, Former US 
Senator Paul Simon, who had become the director of a public policy institute at 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIU-C), initiated an effort to bring the legislative 
leaders together to find common ground on an ethics and campaign finance reform bill. 
A group of four legislators designated by the four legislative leaders met under the 
leadership of Mike Lawrence, the assistant director of the SIU-C policy institute and 
former senior advisor and press secretary to Governor Jim Edgar. The resulting bill 
passed the legislature by a wide margin and was signed into law by Governor Jim 
Edgar. The most important provisions of the 1998 reform law were to establish a ban on 
gifts to elected state officials, governmental employees and judges from individuals who 
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had an interest in decisions made those elected officials and government employees; 
require electronic filing of political committee reports which exceeded a dollar threshold 
of receipts or expenditures; prohibit candidates from taking campaign funds for personal 
use; ban fundraising events in Springfield on session days; prohibit soliciting or 
receiving campaign contributions on state property; and increase the fines the State 
Board of Elections could impose for violations of the campaign finance law. 
 George Ryan was elected Governor in 1998 following a campaign plagued by 
allegations of corruption in the Office of the Secretary of State during his tenure. A 
federal investigation, Operation Safe Roads, began producing indictments of employees 
of the Secretary of State’s office in the fall of 1998. By the time Ryan announced in 
2001 that he would not seek reelection, 39 employees from the Secretary of State office 
had already plead guilty or been convicted of criminal charges. In April of 2002, 
following an investigation by the US Attorney’s office, Citizens for Ryan, George Ryan’s 
campaign committee, and two top officials from the campaign (and former officials in the 
Secretary of State’s office) were indicted on federal racketeering charges involving 
corruption in Ryan’s 1998 campaign for governor. By the time Rod Blagojevich was 
sworn in as Illinois’ new Governor in January 2003, the stories of public corruption – 
including government employees taking bribes and converting some of those funds into 
campaign contributions, state employees working on political campaigns while on the 
state payroll, misappropriation of public funds, and mail fraud – had been on the front 
pages of the state’s daily newspapers for four years. 
 Against this backdrop, the legislature passed a comprehensive ethics bill in the 
spring of 2003. Governor Blagojevich used his amendatory veto to make changes in the 
legislation he contended would strengthen the bill. Following negotiation in the fall veto 
session a new bill was passed and signed into law. The State Officials and Employees 
Ethics Act strengthened ethics rules for state employees, tightened the gift ban 
restrictions, established an executive ethics commission and executive inspectors 
general for each constitutional office, and established a legislative ethics commission 
and a legislative inspector general. History would prove it ironic, but Governor 
Blagojevich was given major credit for producing a stronger bill than what had passed 
the legislature in the spring. Former Governor Ryan was indicted on federal charges of 
political corruption in December of 2003 and convicted in the spring of 2006. 
 Amid federal investigations, allegations of patronage hiring, and questions 
concerning campaign contributions, Governor Blagojevich’s reputation as a political 
reformer quickly deteriorated. One of the most persistent and troubling patterns was the 
linkage between campaign contributors and their receipt of jobs, appointments and state 
contracts. This type of corruption goes by the name “pay-to-play” indicating a situation 
where only those who are willing to pay government officials will be granted jobs, 
appointments, or government contracts. In spite of federal indictments against two of his 
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appointees to state boards in 2005 and a major fundraiser in 2006 for pay-to-play 
schemes, Blagojevich was re-elected in 2006. After several years of percolation, the 
legislature took up a bill in 2007 that would have eliminated pay-to-play practices by 
prohibiting contributions from individuals with state contracts to the public official who 
awarded the contract. The bill passed the House unanimously and moved to the 
Senate. In spite of having 49 out of 59 State Senators as co-sponsors, the bill did not 
move out of the Senate Rules Committee. Senate President Emil Jones, Jr., an ally of 
Governor Blagojevich, blocked the bill from being called. Following another year of 
investigations and newspaper reports linking contributions to jobs, appointments, and 
contracts, a new bill was passed by both chambers in May of 2008. The Governor tried 
to block the bill with an amendatory veto. The House quickly overrode the Governor’s 
veto and after some drama, the veto was overridden in the Senate and became law.  
 On December 9, 2008 Governor Blagojevich was arrested on federal corruption 
changes. He was impeached by the Illinois House on January 9, 2009 and removed 
from office following a trial and conviction by the Illinois Senate on January 30, 2009. In 
the wake of yet another major political corruption scandal, political reform was back on 
the public agenda in Illinois. Patrick Quinn, the new Governor, set up a blue-ribbon 
citizen’s commission to make recommendations for political reforms. In response to the 
political scandal and to ensure that they, rather than an outside commission, controlled 
the agenda, the legislative leaders set up a joint House-Senate committee to consider 
legislative actions. In 2009 the legislature passed a series of reform measures. A 
constitutional amendment adding a recall provision for the Office of Governor was 
placed on the 2010 general election ballot. New laws were put in place in 2009 that 
strengthened state purchasing procedures, increased disclosure of lobbying activities, 
expanded the powers of state inspectors general, reformed procedures for appointment 
to state pension boards, and strengthened the Freedom of Information Act. One of the 
most significant and contentious reforms measures to become law that year was a 
campaign finance reform bill that placed limits on contributions for the first time in the 
state’s history. The law also provided for a significant expansion of disclosure 
requirements and increased the enforcement powers of the State Board of Elections.  
 The 2009 changes in the state’s campaign finance law predated the US Supreme 
Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010, a Federal Appellate Court’s SpeechNow 
decision in 2010, and US Supreme Court’s McComish decision in 2011. Those 
decisions and the sharp increase in independent expenditures in the 2010 election 
(which were partially triggered by those decisions) created a new policy and political 
environment in Illinois and nationally. Early in 2012 an interest group was granted an 
injunction against the Illinois State Board of Elections prohibiting them from enforcing 
limits on contributions to groups who made only independent expenditures in Illinois 
campaigns. In May 2012 a law was enacted that waived the limits on contributions in 
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races where independent expenditures exceed dollar thresholds specific to the office 
being contested. The application of contribution limits (with the waiver trigger) to state 
legislative elections for the first time in the 2012 general election cycle and statewide 
elections for the first time in 2014 combined with the likelihood of increased independent 
expenditures and an evolving policy environment creates an uncertain future for 
campaign finance reform in Illinois. 
Appendix A provides a more detailed timeline of the most significant political reform 
laws enacted since 1990. 
 
Part B Case Studies  
The 1998 State Gift Ban Act (PA 90-737)xv 
 The only significant change in the Illinois campaign finance law between its 
adoption in 1974 and 1997 occurred in 1990. At that point political committees were 
required to file reports of receipts and expenditures on a semi-annual rather than an 
annual basis. The law remained only a disclosure law for more than 20 years. During 
that time the role of money in Illinois politics remained a low visibility issue for news 
media and the citizens of Illinois. That was about to change. 
 Working independently in the early 1990s, one of the authors of this paper, 
Professor Kent Redfield at the University of Illinois Springfield, and the news staff at the 
State Journal Register (SJR) began developing databases of state campaign 
contributions. Redfield published three articles in Illinois Issues magazine
xviii
xvi and a 1995 
book, Cash Clout,xvii which documented the flow of private money into Illinois elections 
and policy making. The SJR used its research to publish a series of articles in 1993-
1994 exploring the links between campaign contributions and public policy decisions. 
Those articles were expanded into a book, Illinois for Sale,  which was published in 
1997. Beginning in 1994 the State Board of Elections also began to construct a 
database of campaign contributions from the paper reports filed by political committees. 
In 1996 it began publishing summary reports from that data. The growing availability of 
data, analysis and commentary on the role of money in Illinois politics helped raise the 
visibility of the issue and move it onto the public agenda. 
 In 1994, the Institute for Public Affairs and Illinois Issues, both located at UIS, 
began the Illinois Campaign Finance Project under the leadership of Ed Wojcicki, the 
editor of Illinois Issues. The project received outside funding and leadership from the 
Joyce Foundation and its vice president, Larry Hansen. The goal of the project was to 
put campaign finance reform on the legislative agenda in Springfield. To give the project 
immediate standing and visibility, U.S. Senator Paul Simon and former Governor 
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William Stratton were recruited to chair a blue-ribbon, bi-partisan task force. The project 
produced eight regional reports and an overall picture of the role of money in Illinois 
politics based on research and analysis conducted by the project staff. Its results were 
presented in regional meetings throughout the state in 1995 and 1996. The steering 
committee produced a report in January 1997, entitled Tainted Democracy.xix The 
report, containing extensive analysis of campaign contributions and 19 specific 
recommendations, was sent to the legislature and Governor Jim Edgar. The report 
received strong news coverage and editorial support. 
 In spite of the momentum from the Simon-Stratton task force and its report, only 
two changes were made in the Illinois campaign finance law in 1997. First, the State 
Board of Elections was authorized to accept reports from political committees in 
electronic form. It was also mandated to make committee reports filed with State Board 
available to the public through a searchable online database. Second, the law was 
changed to eliminate the requirement that individuals examining committee reports 
provide extensive personal information to each committee examined and to certify that 
they would not use the data to solicit contributors. Those seeking to view the reports 
found this requirement intimidating and cumbersome. Keeping the requirement would 
also have made anonymously viewing reports on line illegal. While seemingly a minor 
change, as a practical matter, implementing the requirement for the creation of a 
searchable on-line database could not be accomplished without mandatory electronic 
filing. That change would come in 1998. 
 Seeking to institutionalize the work of the Illinois Campaign Finance Project, 
Joyce vice president Larry Hansen initiated an effort to create a non-for profit 
organization that would continue to build the case for political reform through research 
and advocacy for new laws in Springfield. The new organization, the Illinois Campaign 
for Political Reform (ICPR)xx, was created in 1997 with the Joyce Foundation 
contributing a significant portion of its funding.  Former US Senator Paul Simon became 
the co-chair of the task force along with former Lieutenant Governor Bob Kustra. The 
other author of this paper, Cynthia Canary, became the director of ICPR. She had been 
the executive director of the League of Women Voters of Illinois and a member of the 
Simon-Stratton task force. The organization quickly became a source of research and 
information and a voice for change in the growing debate over political ethics and the 
role of money in Illinois. 
 The summer of 1997 also brought a federal trial where the owners of a private 
company and employees and supervisors from the Illinois Department of Public Aid 
were convicted for a bribery and influence peddling scheme to fix a state contract. The 
company was Management Services of Illinois (MSI) and the case and its political 
fallout became known as the MSI scandal. The indictments and convictions were limited 
to individuals from the company and the agency. But the news accounts of the trial and 
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the details of the indictments suggested a broader picture of widespread corruption with 
access and influence built through gifts and campaign contributions. Among those 
linked to the scandal by the indictments and testimony in the trial were legislative 
leaders, legislative staff, and officials within the Office of the Governor. Ultimately no 
one from the Governor Edgar’s office was indicted and the prosecutions ended with the 
acquittal of a high-ranking official in Department of Public Aid in the spring of 1998. 
 It was within this context that an effort to pass a major ethics and campaign 
finance law in 1998 took place. Former Senator Paul Simon had become director of new 
public policy institute at SIU-C in 1997. He hired Mike Lawrence, a senior advisor and 
press secretary to Governor Jim Edgar, to become associate director. It had been 
Lawrence who first contacted federal prosecutors after hearing reports that criminal 
activity in the form of bribes and the fixing of contracts might be taking place at the 
Department of Public Aid. A longtime advocate of ethics and campaign finance reform, 
Simon felt that the momentum from the Simon-Stratton task force report and the MSI 
scandal presented an opportunity in 1998 to get a campaign finance reform bill passed 
in Springfield. Simon asked Lawrence to be the point person to work with the legislative 
leaders in Springfield to craft a bill that could pass the legislature and be signed into 
law. The Joyce Foundation through the efforts of its vice president, Larry Hansen, 
provided financial and intellectual support of the project.  
 Simon and Lawrence’s plan was to get each of the four leaders to designate a 
member who could negotiate for their respective caucuses as part of a working group. 
The goal was to produce a bill that was agreeable to each caucus. In Lawrence’s words, 
“The strategy that evolved was essentially this: Assemble a bipartisan group of 
legislators from the House and the Senate. Make experts on campaign finance available 
to them. Through a low-key, unofficial process, encourage and help them to reach 
consensus on significant reforms. Convert that consensus into legislation. Pass the 
legislation.”xxi  
 Working with the legislative leaders, Lawrence got commitments that each would 
appoint one of their members to represent their legislative caucus in the working group. 
Governor Edgar also agreed to appoint a staff member to participate. Those appointed 
by the two Senate leaders were Republican Senator Kirk Dillard and Democratic 
Senator Barack Obama. The two House leaders appointed Democratic Representative 
Gary Hannig and Republican Representative Jack Kubik. The representative of the 
Governor’s office was Andy Foster. Providing outside expertise and research to the 
group were Ron Michaelson, director of the State Board of Elections and Kent Redfield, 
a professor from UIS and one of the authors of this paper. Lawrence acted as convener 
and facilitator for the discussions. 
 
25 
 
 The group met at a neutral site away from the Capitol - a conference room at a 
downtown Springfield hotel. At the onset, the group agreed to put everything on the 
table, to look for what would now be called low-hanging fruit first before considering 
more controversial proposals, and to essentially give each caucus veto power over any 
changes in the law that the group was considering. When a particular proposal had 
general support in the group, the members would take the concept back to their 
respective caucuses for discussion. The broad outline of a bill emerged in the late 
spring.  
 The arena then shifted to the legislature. Partisan legislative staff and bi-partisan 
bill drafting staff were given the task of turning concepts into specific language. This is 
always difficult because what seem clear in general terms may be difficult to write into 
legal terms and implement without triggering unintended consequences. Once in bill 
form, the legislation needed to be sold to those groups and individuals who are 
advocates for political reform. This was a role reversal for the advocate groups which 
were used to trying to convince legislators to accept a reform proposal. Having the 
imprimatur of Paul Simon, an icon for political reform, and Mike Lawrence, who had a 
reputation as a savvy, hard headed realist helped close the deal with the reform 
community. At the same time, individual legislators also needed reassurance that their 
concerns are being addressed and interests protected. The importance of the details of 
the changes to the rules of the game to the legislators was evident in the lengthy floor 
debate in the House prior to the bill’s passage. In spite of some misgivings, the bill 
passed the legislature by wide margins on May 22. Governor Edgar signed the bill into 
law on August 12, 1998.  
 The new law, the Gift Ban Act of 1988 (PA 90-737), made three substantial 
changes in prohibiting gifts from interested parties to public officials, prohibiting certain 
campaign contributions and expenditures, and increasing campaign finance disclosure. 
 The gift ban prohibited gifts of monetary value to public officials, government 
employees, and judges from individuals and entities which had an interest in the 
outcome of any official actions that might be taken by the recipient. Bribery and 
extortion have been always been illegal under state and federal law. But proving that a 
gift to a public official is part of quid pro quo requires establishing intent with reasonable 
certainty.  When is a gift more than a gift, particularly when a personal relationship 
already exists between the two parties? Certain actions may raise suspicions, but 
whether they are illegal can only be established in a court of law. At the same time, a 
correlation of gifts and favors between someone who receives a state contract and the 
person responsible for awarding the contract raises serious doubts about the fairness 
and honesty of the process regardless of the reality of the relationship. When the 
general public and the news media lose faith in the integrity of the public officials and 
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the process of government, the legitimacy upon which the whole system rests comes 
into question.  
 By making illegal the giving and accepting of gifts between public officials and 
those who have an interest in the official actions of those officials, both the reality and 
perception of corruption is eliminated. Transactions that would corrupt the process or 
appear to corrupt the process are prohibited by definition and the issue of intent never 
comes into play. The weakness of the 1998 gift ban was the 23 exceptions that were 
written into the law. While those have been significantly reduced since the original act 
was passed, the law continues to deal in shades of gray rather than in bright line, zero 
tolerance absolutes. As such, it is reflective of the resilience and default tendencies of 
Illinois political culture. 
  The new law prohibited the use of campaign funds for personal use effective 
January 1, 1999. The definition of “personal use” was narrow and limited to prohibiting 
only those expenditures that would provide a personal benefit to the candidate and/or 
office holder. Sitting members of the legislature were grandfathered in through a 
provision that allowed them upon retirement from public office to take campaign funds 
equal to the balance of their fund on June 30, 1999 as personal income. While this 
grandfather clause was not ideal from a public policy perspective, it was critical to 
sealing the deal politically. This change eliminated a very significant source of 
corruption and unethical behavior in the area of money in politics in Illinois. Previously, 
legislators had been known to use campaign funds to buy clothes, cars, and liquor to 
benefit themselves personally rather than their campaign organizations. Committee 
funds were used by candidates to finance homes, pay college tuition, cover nursing 
home costs for the care of spouses, and cover county club dues. In addition to the 
obvious ethical questions and questions of public perception, politicians who become 
dependent on their contributors to finance their life styles have divided loyalties between 
the interests of their contributors and the interests of their constituents. 
 The law also prohibited office holders and candidates from conducting 
fundraisers within 50 miles of the Capitol during the last 90 days of the spring session 
when the legislature was in session. This eliminated the spectacle of session day 
fundraising events where lobbyists would give campaign contributions at a fundraising 
breakfast to a committee chair who would then decide the fate of their bills later that 
day. Lobbyists often felt pressured to contribute, while some legislators felt 
uncomfortable with the appearance of a linkage between money and votes.  
 Although not initially apparent, probably the most significant provision of the new 
law was mandating the electronic filing of contribution and expenditure reports by 
political committees with the State Board of Elections. The law also increased the fines 
the Board could levy to insure compliance with the campaign finance law. Regardless of 
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where one comes down in the debate over how or even if the flow of money in politics 
should be regulated, most everyone, at least in principal, is in favor of timely, accurate, 
complete disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures. For some 
transparency is the beginning of what needs to be done. For others, it is all that needs 
to be done. But almost everyone agrees that it should be done, although resistance to 
applying comprehensive disclosure and reporting requirement to those who fund the 
super PAC independent expenditure groups shows that in today’s world the issue is not 
completely settled, thanks to the U. S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Citizens United 
case. 
 Prior to 1997, information about campaign contributions and expenditures in 
Illinois was public information in only the absolute minimalist sense of the word “public.” 
Committee reports were filed on paper. The State Board of Elections staff put them on 
microfiche. Anyone wanting to view a report had to come to the Board’s Springfield or 
Chicago office and fill out a form prior to looking at the microfiche. The microfiche could 
also be purchased from the offices of the Board. Requiring reports to be filed 
electronically and putting reports on the State Board of Election’s website meant that 
anyone with internet access could view reports as soon as they were posted on-line. 
The Web-accessible system became operational in 2000. Today the State Board of 
Elections’ electronic disclosure and reporting system is a model for other states and the 
federal government.  
 The structure and process created by Paul Simon and Mike Lawrence to produce 
the Gift Ban Act was not unlike the agreed bill process that the legislature has used 
historically in particular policy areas. An agreed bill process is a closed process 
conducted in private where the opposing sides attempt to reach consensus on an issue. 
If successful, the work product is presented to the legislature for ratification as an 
unalterable agreement. An example would be the unemployment compensation 
legislation where agreements negotiated between the representatives of big business 
and big labor have been presented to the legislature for ratification with no floor 
amendment accepted. What was different in this case was the legislature, rather than 
being a facilitator between competing interests, was negotiating with itself about 
changes in the basic rules of the game for the political process.  
 An agreed to bill process contrasts sharply with the more commonplace process 
where those advocating for a policy change seek legislative allies and utilize outside 
pressure and coalition building in very public way to pass legislation. While some 
element of compromise is always a part of the legislative process, an agreed bill 
approach gives veto power to each of the participants on an equal basis as the proposal 
develops. The tradeoff of an increased chance of getting an agreement passed is a 
deceased chance the final agreement will push the boundaries of the policy debate. 
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 The process utilized in 1998 shaped the final proposal in ways that might have 
been different if the negotiations had begun from the outside with a legislative proposal 
drafted by a reform group or initiated by a governor. The final version of the Gift Ban Act 
contained a grandfather clause that allowed sitting legislators to take a portion of their 
campaign funds with them for personal use when they retired. When Congress dealt 
with the issue of personal use in the 1980s, siting members of Congress could chose to 
stay and discontinue the practice of personal use or retire and take part of their fund 
with them.  By focusing narrowly on personal use, the discussions in Illinois never got to 
the general issue of campaign committees spending money for non-election purposes. 
It remains permissible in Illinois for a campaign committee to buy baseball team season 
tickets to be used by the committee’s volunteers or staff or use campaign funds to buy 
Christmas gifts for the friends and supporters of the elected official.  
 Some of the changes where clearly about appearances, but were important 
nevertheless. Prior to 1998 it was not illegal for a lobbyist to stand outside an Illinois 
legislative chamber and hand envelopes with campaign contributions to members as 
they came off the chamber floor. This activity had actually been observed and reported 
by news reporters. The new law prohibited the acceptance or solicitation of campaign 
contributions on state property.  
 
 The new law prohibited lobbyists from giving gifts to public officials, but one of 
the exemptions was for “food and beverages consumed on the premises.” In practical 
terms this mean lobbyists winning and dining legislators. Could a stricter law have 
gotten through the legislature by utilizing a different process? The consensus among 
the four legislators in the working groups was that completely eliminating the exemption 
for wining and dining would have been a deal-breaker for all four of the caucuses. 
  Ultimately, the process produced a bill that passed the legislature and was 
signed into law. Given the nature of politics in Illinois at the time, passing a law that 
made giving gifts to public officials illegal by definition and significant changes in the 
campaign finance law for the first time since its passage in 1974 was both historic and 
surprising.  
 Would a frontal assault from a reform group using media coverage and editorial 
support have produced a law that did not grandfather in the then-current members of 
the General Assembly on personal use and reigned in non-electoral expenditures? 
Possibly, though it is perhaps more likely that no law at all would have emerged from 
such a strategy. While the law might look modest from the perspective of 2012, it was 
significant and controversial to those impacted. Soon after its passage legislators tried 
unsuccessfully to revert from mandatory to optional electronic reporting. Senator Denny 
Jacobs (D Rock Island) sued in Will County to have the entire law struck down. 
Ultimately the law was upheld by the Illinois State Supreme Court. 
29 
 
2003 State Officers and Employees Ethics Act (PA95-615)xxii 
 
 The roots of the ethics act passed in 2003 can be found in a tragedy that took 
place in 1994. An illegally licensed truck driver caused a horrific highway accident that 
killed six children. The death of the Willis children precipitated a decade long wake up 
call to the people of Illinois. 
 
 This tragedy painfully demonstrated that the price of political corruption is far 
greater than the few extra wasted pennies everyone suspected was tucked into 
appropriation bills each year. For decades Illinoisans ignored or discounted mounting 
evidence that a culture of corruption had overtaken their state capital.  Over the years, 
the colorful shenanigans of Illinois politicians became the stuff of legend: shoeboxes 
stuffed with cash, insiders enjoying questionable tax breaks and political leaders packed 
off to jail. And if no one actually championed public corruption per se, some took 
perverse pride in the belief that the corrupt politics in our state were bigger, bolder and 
far more entertaining than anywhere else. 
 
 The Willis tragedy ultimately exposed a multi-tentacled conspiracy reaching into 
both the Secretary of State’s Office and George Ryan’s ultimately successful campaign 
for Governor.  Over the next nine years the US Attorney’s Operation Safe Roads 
investigation yielded 65 indictments and 58 federal convictions including then former 
Governor George Ryan. 
 
 The problems exposed by Operation Safe Roads illuminated many failures in 
Illinois government: political work conducted on the public payroll; powerful interests 
reaping profits from their associations in state government; contacts and favoritism 
trumping ability in hiring; shake downs for campaign cash; and disclosure laws that 
were too easily evaded.  Amazingly, while the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Northern Illinois 
conducted a vigorous stream of prosecutions, the political establishment failed to 
implement procedures to address the multitude of sins revealed by the investigation. 
 
 Reformers began to work on ethics in earnest in late 1999.  Fearful that the 
courts might eviscerate the 1998 Gift Ban Act, a coalition including the Illinois Campaign 
for Political Reform (ICPR), Illinois PIRG, the League of Women Voters of Illinois, the 
Citizen Advocacy Center, Common Cause, Protestants for the Common Good and 
Citizen Action, began developing  proposals to address core weaknesses in Illinois’ 
governmental ethics. From the outset, reformers were insistent that the focus be both 
on rooting out corruption and, more importantly, on preventing future scandals. 
 
 The impact of this campaign for ethics reform was initially glacial - a modest 
piece of reform legislation banning regulators from soliciting campaign contributions 
from those they inspected or licensed was passed in the spring of 2002. However, years 
of scandal pushed Illinois residents to the breaking point and ethics reform suddenly 
began polling strongly during the 2002 campaigns. As a result, “changing business as 
usual” became the talk of the campaign trail, giving the issue explosive new momentum.   
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 ICPR deployed a detailed inside/outside strategy to make governmental ethics a 
centerpiece legislative and election issue.  A primary concern was holding the ground 
staked in the 1998 Gift Ban Act.  To this end, reformers organized to make the case for 
ethics in meeting with editorial boards throughout the state, which resulted in nearly a 
dozen editorials decrying governmental corruption.   At the request of key legislators, 
ICPR developed model ethics legislation and conducted extensive research on model 
ethics codes, commissions and enforcement. 
  
 In May 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the 1998 Gift Ban Act in its 
entirety finding that the petitioners did not have standing to bring suit.  This development 
freed reform groups to push forward on the legislative front and look to expand the 
ethics provisions on the books. 
 
 In the waning days of the 2002 spring legislative session HB 4680 was 
introduced by Representative John Fritchey.  The bill banned elected officials from 
accepting gifts valued in excess of $100 per year from lobbyists and government 
contractors; banned all candidates for public office from receiving campaign 
contributions solicited by a public employee from a regulated business; prohibited nearly 
all state and local government employees who regulate businesses from soliciting those 
businesses for campaign contributions; and prohibited all state and local government 
employees from knowingly working in concert with those who regulate to solicit any 
regulated business. 
 
 Reformers undertook a vigorous offensive to force consideration of this proposal.  
Once introduced it passed easily and was widely lauded.  HB4680 was the first major 
ethics reform measure to pass the legislature since Illinois enacted the Gift Ban Act in 
1998.  It also was the final bill signed into law by outgoing Governor George Ryan. 
 
 During the 2002 campaign, ICPR worked with candidates from both parties to 
encourage them to address ethics and campaign finance issues in their campaigns. 
ICPR met with representatives of all of the gubernatorial campaigns to provide 
background and analysis as they prepared their position papers on reform issues and 
surveyed all candidates on where they stood on those topics. In addition, ICPR 
conducted a concentrated media campaign on ethics by placing letters to the editor in 
papers throughout the state and generating newspaper editorials in support of ethics 
and campaign finance reform legislation.  The goal was - to the extent possible - make 
ethics a centerpiece issue in the elections. 
 
 The results of the 2002 election showed that voters felt strongly about cleaning 
up government. Both gubernatorial candidate Rod Blagojevich (who would very soon 
begin to show tears in his own ethical fabric) and Attorney General candidate Lisa 
Madigan made state government reform a key campaign issue and continued to speak 
out once elected. Early in the 93rd General Assembly, House Minority Leader Tom 
Cross introduced a package of ethics legislation, staking his caucus’s reputation on 
reform.  A few legislators, most notably Senators Susan Garrett and Kirk Dillard, and 
Representatives John Fritchey and Beth Coulson worked for reform. Illinois’ political 
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legends Dawn Clark Netsch and Abner Mikva also weighed in with their support. 
 
 In early 2003, the first of many meetings was held between representatives of 
reform groups, the four legislative caucuses, the Governor’s office, and the Attorney 
General’s office.  Significantly, House Speaker Michael Madigan attended this first 
session and gave his personal assurances that the legislature would address 
comprehensive ethics reform. Because of Speaker Madigan’s well-earned reputation for 
tenaciousness, it was a promise that would provide comfort when negotiations later 
became rocky. 
 
 Initially, the hope of reform groups was that the process would be modeled on the 
1998 Gift Ban negotiations where representatives from each caucus formed a working 
group to refine a draft proposal.  Instead, bipartisanship largely was cast aside and a 
Democratic working group composed of staff from the Speaker’s, the Governor’s and 
the Attorney General’s offices used draft language written by ICPR and supported by 
the reform community as a starting point. 
 
 It was far from smooth sailing throughout the spring and summer of 2003.  A 
comprehensive ethics bill passed the House late in the spring session.  However, the 
Senate refused to call it for a vote, instead, insisting on a much weaker reform measure.  
With time running out on the spring session, the House relented and passed the Senate 
language.  That measure, House Bill 3412, was sharply criticized by both Gov. Rod 
Blagojevich and good government groups, who argued that the bill lacked key 
enforcement measures.   
 
 The Governor’s use of an amendatory veto to try to rewrite the House Bill 3412 
inflamed an already a tense situation, virtually bringing communication between the 
legislative caucuses and the Governor’s office to a halt.  ICPR spent the summer of 
2003 engaged in intense negotiations to bring the key players back to the table.  
Reformers also redoubled efforts to focus press attention on the ethics question. 
 
 Work began on what would become a series of amendments to the legislative 
vehicle for significant ethics reform, Senate Bill 702. The legislative negotiators 
narrowed the provisions from the reformers’ ethics bill draft that would have applied 
FOIA and Open Meetings provisions to the work of the ethics commissions. In other 
areas they significantly broadened the impact of the bill by adding a ban on state 
officials appearing in public service announcements and a ban on lobbyists serving on 
important boards and commissions.  Still other components including the reporting of ex 
parte communications in rule making emerged solely from within the political process.   
 
 The final language in the bill established Inspector Generals (IG's) and ethics 
commissions for both the executive and legislative branches.  However, with so much 
focus on scandal from George Ryan’s tenure as Secretary of State and Governor, 
reformers concentrated their efforts on getting teeth into the application and 
enforcement of the process in the executive branch.  This resulted in the creation of a 
somewhat less functional structure to police the legislature.  The bill which had started 
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based upon some relatively simple principles grew increasingly complex as negotiations 
unfolded against a backdrop of mistrust and hostility between the legislature and the 
Governor. 
 
 Some of these revisions to the original reform draft made solid sense from a 
policy perspective, while others seemed to be little more than a politically motivated 
game of chess.  Nowhere was this more the case than in attempting to strike the 
balance between the investigative powers of the Inspector General and the adjudicative 
powers of the new ethics commission.  In many ways the communication breakdowns 
and mistrust in the negotiation of this bill foreshadowed the dysfunctional relationship 
which would plague Blagojevich and the General Assembly during the rest of his tenure 
as Governor. 
 
 The 2003 ethics law contains several key safeguards to expose and prevent 
corruption.  In part, the law is designed to help state employees and officials do the right 
thing by providing them with guidance and training.  From the reform perspective, the 
Executive Ethics Commission, the Inspectors General and the required training were 
the key provisions in the bill.  The Executive Ethics Commission was designed to 
become the public face of ethics, responsible for reporting to the public on how the 
integrity of government is being protected.  It would prove to be some time before it 
actually was able to function that way. 
 
 As the 2003 Veto Session drew to a close, even veteran observers were stunned 
by the scope of Senate Bill 702, the renegotiated ethics bill sent to the Governor. While 
it was common knowledge that ethics was in play, few were willing to bet on the 
prospect that such a bold package would actually become law. But reformers were able 
to capitalize on a confluence of factors - new political leadership, an irate public, the fall-
out over Illinois’ license for bribes political scandal – enabling the unthinkable to happen. 
In a final twist, the legislature also overrode the Governor’s veto of HB 3412 the day 
before they passed SB 702, allowing the provisions of HB 3421 to become law in 
concert with SB 702. 
 
 When signing SB 702 into law, Blagojevich said, "What we are seeing tonight is 
the best of democracy in action.  Good government activists, legislative leaders, 
executive branch leaders, and political leaders from both sides of the aisle came 
together to create the most comprehensive, thorough and thoughtful ethics legislation of 
any state in the nation. On this historic night, we've started giving the citizens of Illinois a 
reason to believe in their government again."   
 
 It is stunning how quickly his words rang hollow.   
 Nevertheless, the legislation set new ethical standards and laid the foundation for 
a system of enforcement and education that Illinois has continued to refine over the past 
decade. 
The main provisions of the 2003 Governmental Ethics Act are set out in Appendix B. 
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2008 Pay-to-Play Law (PA-95-0971)     
 While Illinois’ governmental leaders had enacted meaningful open government 
and ethics legislation in the years preceding the 2008 pay-to-play campaign 
contributions law, they had not yet addressed the central role of money in state politics 
outside of disclosure requirements. There were still no prohibitions on the source and 
size of a contribution any candidate or political committee could accept. 
 One thing that had changed, however, was the heightened media spotlight on the 
role of money in Illinois politics.  In the years following the George Ryan licenses for 
bribes scandal, virtually no political story failed to include an accounting of the money 
behind the political actors.  This was facilitated by increased campaign disclosure and 
groups such as the Sunshine Project and the Illinois Campaign for Political Reform 
which were dedicated to making campaign finance data easily available and 
understandable to reporters and the public.  By the time Governor Rod Blagojevich was 
ensconced in the statehouse “follow the money” practically had become the state motto.   
 Polling conducted in 2006 and 2008 by Belden Russonello & Stewart for the 
Midwest Democracy Network revealed the public's sharply declining faith in the 
trustworthiness of elected officials.  The poll reported that, “Residents of Illinois clearly 
express distrust in their state government.  A large majority of residents (77% overall) 
trusts government to do what is right “only some of the time (….)Distrust of state 
government has increased since 2006 when 64% trusted state government “some of 
the time” or “almost never.”xxiii In a 2006 poll conducted by Belden Russonello & Stewart 
for the Joyce Foundation the respondents reported believing that “unless we limit the 
influence of money in government, elected officials will not be able to keep their 
promises on issues that are important to people like me.” One item on the menu of 
reform options the public was polled on in 2008 was particularly striking for the margin 
of support it received. “Not allow state contractors to make political contributions to 
elected officials who issue contracts” ” (88% said doing so would make a difference, 
including 61% who said it would make a “big difference”).xxiv 
 Despite increasing public concern about corruption in government and money in 
politics, voters had reelected Blagojevich and the Illinois General Assembly had 
demonstrated little interest in taking on the issue of campaign finance reform. 
Lawmakers continued to portray scandals as the acts of bad actors, and not the result 
of flaws in the political system. Illinois, with its highly centralized style of legislative 
leadership, appeared to work just fine from the perspective of those operating within the 
system. The legislative leaders’ unwillingness to explore the issue changed as 
Blagojevich’s highly public and completely shameless cash grabs became so unseemly 
that the role of unrestricted campaign contributions in Illinois politics could no longer be 
ignored even by those at the center of power. 
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 Blagojevich, who ran on a reform platform, began conspiring to profit from his 
office even before being sworn in according to federal indictments.  Cracks in his ethical 
facade began publicly appearing very early in his first term, including allegations of 
corruption and patronage hiring. In 2005, the indictments began to flow beginning with 
indictments of Stuart Levine and Joseph Cari for an extortion scheme involving pension 
fund investments.  When Cari pleaded guilty on September 15, the plea agreement 
contained a reference to a public official “A” who was alleged to be part of the criminal 
conspiracy. Public official “A” was widely assumed to be Blagojevich.xxv This was 
confirmed in court proceedings in 2008. In his October 2006 announcement of a 24-
count indictment against Tony Rezko, a major fundraiser for the Governor and one of 
his inner circle, US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald described Illinois’ system as an illegal 
"pay-to-play scheme on steroids.”xxvi  
 Public corruption indictments were nothing new to Illinois residents. The George 
Ryan license for bribes scandal was still clear in the rearview mirror with the convictions 
of scores of people, including the former Governor and his chief of staff Scott Fawell.  
Ryan was an old school politician, a back slapper and a favor grantor.  Blagojevich's 
story was a different one.  
 Rod Blagojevich marked a new model of greed and ambition in Illinois politics.  A 
joint analysis conducted by the Sunshine Project and ICPR in 2009 found that over a 
six-year period George Ryan raised almost $20 million, including 35 contributions of 
$25,000 which constituted 8.2 percent of his total.  By contrast, in the eight years that 
included Blagojevich's time as governor, he raised $58.3 million, including 435 
contributions of $25,000 or more, which constituted 35.3 percent of his total.xxvii The 
audacity and the scale of the political corruption were revealed in the stories about 
Governor Blagojevich and his kitchen cabinet. Revelations that everything from jobs to 
contracts to political appointments seemed to have a price on them stunned even the 
most blasé Illinoisans.  Was Illinois really for sale?  The question, which had long been 
in the background, had now moved to the forefront and was impossible to ignore. 
  This was the question which in 2004 spurred state Comptroller Dan Hynes to 
quietly begin investigating the relationship between contracts and political contributions.  
What he found both alarmed him and spurred him to action.  In February 2005, Hynes 
took a bold public stand against Illinois' contracts for cash culture. He became the first 
Illinois constitutional officer to issue an executive order saying he would not accept 
campaign contributions from people doing more than $10,000 in business with his 
office.   In doing so he indirectly challenged to his fellow constitutional officers to follow 
suit.  With the exception of the Governor, the others quickly did so.  The legislature, 
however, was slow to recognize the significance of this action or to embrace the issue.   
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 With the Governor's failure to take the bait, Hynes reached out to the reform 
community and progressive legislators to fashion a bill to ban pay-to-play politics.  
Some members of the reform community felt that this didn't go far enough and that full 
public financing or at least across the board contribution limits were needed to contain 
the growing problem of money in Illinois politics.  Despite the debate, it was widely 
recognized by the reform community that the ban on pay-to-play -- a very specific 
solution for a specific problem -- had a far greater chance to succeed than some of the 
more sweeping reforms they proposed.  Hynes rounded out his package by also calling 
for public financing of campaigns for Supreme Court judges and enforcement of the 
lobbyist registration act, so that the proposals truly attempted to address multiple issues 
on multiple fronts.  However, it was clear that the centerpiece of this campaign was the 
ban on pay-to-play. 
  By taking on a leadership position on this issue, Hynes stepped outside the 
typical parameters of his office.  As Comptroller he was responsible for insuring the 
state's bills were paid, not policing its ethics.  But his statewide office gave him 
something of a bully pulpit and he proved very adept at using it.  Young, but a long time 
political actor from an important family in Democratic politics, Hynes seemed motivated 
by a true disgust of what he saw occurring in state government.  Non-confrontational 
and understated by nature, Hynes fashioned his message around public policy rather 
than the behavior of specific individuals and sought to build pressure both inside and 
outside the Statehouse.  In rolling out his proposal in 2005, neither he nor his allies in 
the reform community would imagine that this effort, which seemed so logical and 
straightforward, would consume them for the better part of three years. 
 In undertaking this fight, Hynes was not without political ambition. He would run 
for Governor against Patrick Quinn in the 2010 Democratic primary, but would lose by 
slightly more than 5,000 votes. 
 Hynes teamed up with the directors of the Illinois Campaign for Political Reform 
and the Better Government Association to meet with newspaper editorial boards in 
every corner of the state.  The message was simple: would contracts be awarded to 
those who offered the best services at the best price? Or would they go to those willing 
to make the largest campaign contributions?  It was an argument grounded in such 
fundamental principles of good government that it was virtually impossible to counter it.  
As a result, the newspaper editorials began to flow and they were effusive—this was a 
reform bandwagon that virtually everyone could climb aboard. 
 In undertaking this campaign, Hynes emerged as the leading advocate inside the 
statehouse for ending a pay-to-play culture in Illinois government. He helped identify 
sponsors, testified at legislative hearings and put the full muscle and profile of his office 
behind the effort for change.  His importance as a leader under the Capitol dome cannot 
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be overstated.  He could and did pick up the phone to nudge reluctant lawmakers or to 
broker discussion between the chambers.  He had access to the media and he had the 
calm, consistent personality that was essential in what ended up being a protracted 
battle.  Hynes brought legitimacy to the effort in a way that no outside reformer could 
have done. 
 At the same time Hynes was presenting the case within the legislature, the 
reform community was engaged in stirring popular sentiment and introducing righteous 
indignation into the debate.  In effect, the close alliance between Hynes and the 
reformers allowed them to play the political equivalent of the good cop, bad cop routine. 
 Pay-to-play was pre-filed as legislation for the next General Assembly in 
December 2006, as HB 1 with Rep. John Fritchey as its chief sponsor.  Republican 
Leader Tom Cross soon joined as a chief co-sponsor and an additional 43 co-sponsors 
from both parties signed on. The bill, containing the key reform measures pushed by 
Hynes and the reformers, was approved by legislative committees in the House early in 
the session.  The bill sought to prohibit anyone with state contracts of more than 
$25,000 (later raised to $50,000) from making political contributions to the constitutional 
officer who awards the contracts. The bill passed the House unanimously.  
 The pay-to-play bill moved onto the Senate where it was sponsored by Senator 
Don Harmon. Despite eventually garnering 49 Senate co-sponsors, it was never 
released from the Senate Rule Committee, the committee through which all legislation 
is routed at the onset.  Senate Republican Leader Christine Radogno attempted to 
dislodge the proposal through a procedural maneuver to no avail.  Senate President 
Emil Jones, a Blagojevich ally, publicly and staunchly opposed allowing a vote on the 
bill.   
 Reformers were incredulous.  How could a bill be sponsored by 49 of the 59 
members of the Senate not be granted a vote in the chamber? Were the sponsors 
insincere?  Were they unwilling to risk their political capital?  Or was the control of 
President Emil Jones so absolute that their voices were rendered irrelevant?  It seemed 
only Governor Rod Blagojevich and President Emil Jones stood publicly against the bill 
and yet no amount of public or private pressure could move it forward.   
 In frustration, Cynthia Canary, the director of ICPR and one of the authors of this 
paper, telephoned the Speaker of the House Michael Madigan seeking his help and 
guidance in pushing the bill through the Senate.  Though the two were not typical 
working partners, Madigan assured her that he would continue to push the bill until it 
passed, suggesting it was only a matter of time before significant pressure forced the 
Senate's hand. 
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 With HB 1 still firmly planted in the Senate Rules Committee, the House tried a 
second time in 2007 to pass the pay-to-play ban by amending it on to Senate Bill 1305, 
which originally amended the State Ethics Act to improve reporting on Statements of 
Financial Interest. This proposal again languished in the Senate Rules Committee. The 
Senate failed, or was not allowed, to take action. 
 Throughout this period, both President Emil Jones and Governor Rod 
Blagojevich publicly slammed the bill for either not going far enough, or at other times 
for being too focused on Blagojevich.  The Governor's response was particularly 
calculated.  He argued that the proposed ban on pay-to-play was simply an attempt by a 
do-nothing legislature to shut down his particular style of populist politics.  His enmity 
was largely focused on the Speaker. From the beginning of his term Blagojevich had a 
combative relationship with the General Assembly that only got worse over time, but it 
was the most vitriolic with the long-time Speaker. The fact was that by this point the bill 
was focused on the current Governor.  The other Constitutional officers had all 
established policies to limit or prohibit contributions from contractors. The Governor was 
the lone holdout.  Effectively, he was responsible for putting the bull’s-eye on his own 
back.   
 Many reformers and some legislators agreed with the claim that the bill did not go 
far enough in addressing the core problems of money in politics. Pay-to-play was a 
narrowly tailored bill, not the more comprehensive reforms that the good government 
groups sought.  It was, however, progress. Neither Jones nor Blagojevich had the trust 
of the reform community. While the Governor issued press releases that set forth bullet 
point lists of reforms he would like to see enacted into law, he did not draft or introduce 
alternative legislation.   
 In October 2007, Hynes raised the bar when he launched Illinois Open Book, a 
website which allowed users to link contractors and campaign donations.  This was 
noteworthy - for the information that it easily made available to the public, but also for 
the fact that Hynes used the resources and executive authority of his office to move the 
issue forward, while legislation languished in the statehouse.   
 In announcing the program, Hynes said, “In the absence of a statutory ban on 
contributions from those who have state contracts, what we can do is create more 
transparency, more awareness, better information for watchdog groups, the media, 
citizens, so that people know who's doing what and perhaps that information will create 
pressure to enact the right legislation that will prohibit it, or, as one of my colleagues 
said, shame people out of not awarding contracts to contributors or getting contributions 
from contractors.” xxviii 
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 In 2008 the effort to enact pay-to-play began anew.  Another editorial board road 
trip was conducted, new sponsors were sought and additional heat was placed on those 
senators who had cast their sights on higher office.  In April, the Chicago Tribune 
published a damning piece of investigative journalism headlined, “The governor’s 
$25,000 club; Big campaign donors to Blagojevich benefit from state.”xxix Rod 
Blagojevich had raised more money into total and more money in single contributions of 
$25,000 or more than any other candidate in the history of Illinois. The Tribune’s 
investigation found 235 checks written for exactly $25,000 and payable to the 
governor’s campaign. The reporters found that three-fourths of them came from people 
or organizations that had received something favorable from the administration, 
including contracts, board appointments, favorable policy positions or regulatory 
actions. The Tribune noted that on numerous occasions, large donations to the 
governor's campaign fund came just weeks or days prior to the donor benefiting from a 
positive action by an agency under the governor's control. 
 In many ways the Tribune article, coupled with increasingly vigorous coverage 
across the state, tipped the balance. 2008 was an election year, with most legislative 
seats up for grabs, and candidates did not want to face the voters with this issue 
unresolved. In late May 2008, with editorials supporting reform action and coverage of 
the ever-growing scandal in the governor’s office continuing to appear in newspapers, 
the pay-to-play bill passed unanimously through both chambers as HB 824. 
 The jubilation was, however, short lived.  In August, Blagojevich amendatorily 
vetoed the pay-to-play legislation insisting he wanted more far reaching reforms.  In 
addition he issued Executive Order 3 (2008) applying pay-to-play restrictions on all 
legislators and executive officers, not just the contract issuer.  He then released the 
outline of new proposals to ban double dipping by legislators; require lobbyists provide 
fuller disclosure and require the legislature to affirmatively accept pay raises.  While 
these proposals could have been developed in detail to have value and meaning, they 
were presented in typical Blagojevich style in a press release.  Universally, the 
legislature, the news media, and the public interpreted the governor's actions for what 
they were, an insincere effort to derail the pay-to-play bill.    
 If the road to reform hadn't already had enough twists and turns, a new wrinkle 
emerged when the legislature took up the Governor’s amendatory veto. After the House 
overrode the veto in September, a reading of the state Constitution suggested that the 
Senate must return to session and do likewise within 15 calendar days if the law was to 
stand.  Once again President Emil Jones showed his obstinacy by refusing to 
reconvene the Senate and arguing that the package of ideas put forward by the 
Governor was a stronger alternative.   
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 With options running out a miracle was needed. It came in the unlikely form of a 
phone call from presidential candidate and former state senator Barack Obama to 
President Jones, who was the Democratic nominee’s former caucus leader and mentor. 
In a private call Obama encouraged Senate President Jones to reconvene the Senate 
to override the governor's veto. The urging was successful.  In announcing he was 
calling the Senate back into session, Jones stated, “I plan to call the Senate back into 
session to deal with the issue of ethics, only at the request of my friend, Barack 
Obama.”xxx On September 22, 2008, the Senate reconvened and overrode the veto. 
The pay-to-play bill was enacted with an effective date of January 1, 2009. 
 Almost unbelievably, Governor Blagojevich immediately established a bi-monthly 
ethics working group led by his General Counsel Bill Quinlan and Deputy Governor Bob 
Greenlee.  The group included Cynthia Canary, Illinois PIRG Director Diane Brown, 
Representatives John Fritchey and Jay Hoffman and Senators Christie Radogno and 
Don Harmon and others. The stated purpose of the group was to discuss adoption of 
the Governor’s ethics proposals.  Under somewhat surreal circumstances the group met 
from October into December debating the Governor's proposals and whether they could 
be crafted into legislation that was fair, meaningful and practical. The double dipping 
prohibition was particularly problematic as it appeared to be aimed directly at the 
Chicago’s statehouse delegation.  The governor’s proposal provided an exemption for 
someone who was a policeman or firefighter, but not a nurse or doctor at the County 
Hospital.  It also raised, but did not attempt to address, other questions about conflicts 
of interests inherent in a part-time legislature, such as if an individual employed by the 
insurance industry should also serve on a committee that deals with insurance-related 
legislation? 
 The discussions in these meetings were often circular. There was a lack of clarity 
about the problems for which solutions were ostensibly being sought, beyond the 
administration's most base political goals.  In sidebar conversations, the participants 
outside the administration seemed clear that the exercise was a sham. But recognizing 
that the office of Governor commanded respect, even if the Governor himself did not, 
they felt they had no choice but to participate.  In a final act of the theater of the absurd, 
the group was scheduled to meet on the day the Governor was arrested on federal 
corruption charges. 
 Ironically, the Governor's December 9, 2008 arrest was partially a result of his 
efforts to get ahead of the imminent pay-to-play ban.  A Chicago Tribune examination of 
the reports filed by his campaign committee indicated that in the 30 days after the 
legislature passed the ban his fundraising targeted those seeking state contracts, 
raising more than $250,000. xxxi And as all of America and much of the world now 
knows, with the election of Barack Obama as President, the Governor felt he had 
something of immense value to try to auction off—a U.S. Senate seat.   
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 The campaign for pay-to-play reform in Illinois was unique due to the leadership 
that Dan Hynes brought to the effort.  Working with the bill's House sponsor, John 
Fritchey, and its Senate sponsor Don Harmon, Hynes was able to confer internal 
consistency and legitimacy to the effort.  This stands in stark contrast to the 2009 battle 
for contribution limits where the weight of public pressure was felt, but no internal actor 
stood up to champion significant campaign finance reform. 
An overview of the provisions of the pay-to- play law is set out in Appendix C. 
 
2009 Campaign Finance Reform Law (PA96-0832) 
 There is an unwritten rule in Illinois’ government reform world: once a substantive 
change, such as the pay-to-play legislation, is enacted, reformers are supposed to fade 
away for several years to let the legislature get on with business without any distracting 
nagging about the need for more reform. This timeout usually lasts until the next major 
political scandal. While this rule is not strictly applied, large changes usually occur on 
this schedule, with smaller tweaks and implementation work done in the interim. 
 The fight for limits was the exception that proved the rule.  The pay-to-play ban 
had yet to reach its effective date when on December 9, 2008 Governor Rod 
Blagojevich was awakened from his sleep by FBI agents and placed under arrest for 
allegedly conditioning contracts on contributions and most shockingly attempting to sell 
the US Senate seat vacated by President-elect Barack Obama.  A story of corruption 
and malfeasance that had been building virtually since the day he was first elected in 
2003 reached a culmination with his arrest. In the rush to stem the damage that 
followed Blagojevich’s arrest, business as usual for Illinois politics was turned on its 
head. 
 The Illinois House moved quickly to begin impeachment proceedings.  On 
December 15 the House voted 113-0 to create a special investigative committee to 
study the allegations against Blagojevich and recommend whether he should be 
impeached.  Concurrently, Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a motion with the Illinois 
Supreme Court to have the Governor removed from office.  The Court quickly rebuffed 
her effort. Blagojevich, on the other hand, defiantly announced that the charges were 
false and that he was the subject of a political witch-hunt. Despite the fervent hopes of 
many Illinois residents and members of his own party, he made it abundantly clear that 
he had no intention of stepping down from office. 
 Against this backdrop, the House Special Investigative Committee, led by 
Representative Barbara Flynn Currie, began hearings on December 17th of December 
2008.  Only eight days had passed since the Governor’s arrest. In addition to the formal 
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charges against Blagojevich, Currie announced that the Committee would look into 
other wrongdoing, including his misuse of legal authority, failure to provide the General 
Assembly with information, improper purchase of a flu vaccine from Canada, violations 
of the Freedom of Information Act and failures to correct problems identified in state 
audits. 
 While Blagojevich did not appear at these hearings, he was represented by 
private counsel, Ed Genson. The hearings were conducted with a great deal of 
solemnity before a gallery packed with interested observers and press from throughout 
the country who provided nightly news viewers with political theatre at its finest.  While 
the bipartisan committee and their counsel attempted to instill dignity into the process, 
the Governor’s attorney proceeded as if in a court room at criminal trial, raising constant 
objections throughout the hearing. 
 On December 23rd, 2008, ICPR was invited to testify on the issue of 
Blagojevich’s fundraising.  House Counsel wanted to introduce the Governor’s patterns 
of pay-to-play into the record, but could not get such testimony from news reporters who 
were conflicted in their role as journalists.  ICPR, which had correlated much of the data 
used in the news reporting, was the next best source.  Over the course of several hours, 
Cynthia Canary, the ICPR Director and one of the authors of this paper outlined in 
extensive detail patterns of large contributions followed by the awarding of contracts or 
appointments.  ICPR explained the stunning growth in the size of contributions over the 
past three gubernatorial administrations.  Questions fielded from the Committee were 
tough, but polite.  Objections from Blagojevich’s attorney were jarring.  Nevertheless, a 
detailed story was put on the record, which highlighted patterns showing how the quest 
for campaign cash appeared to drive decisions made by the Governor.  For an advocate 
who was used to an unfriendly reception in legislative committee hearings when she 
tried to argue that unregulated campaign finance is a problem Canary found it a new 
experience to be officially asked to document the patterns that she had criticized for so 
long. 
 Unashamed and acting as if immune from the fanfare surrounding the committee 
hearings, Governor Blagojevich named former state Attorney General Roland Burris on 
December 30th to replace president-elect Obama in the US Senate.  The announcement 
was met with shock.  The action made clear that Blagojevich would not go quietly and 
that he planned to use whatever power still remained in his grasp for as long as he 
could. After a huge public uproar, Burris was sworn into office on January 15, 2009. He 
served without distinction until the next election. 
 In reaction to Blagojevich’s intransigence, Lt. Governor Patrick Quinn announced 
the formation of the Illinois Reform Commission on January 5th. The Commission 
became part of the Quinn Administration through Executive Order 1, issued January 30, 
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2009. Chaired by former Assistant U.S. Attorney Pat Collins, it included luminaries such 
as US Senator Paul Simon’s daughter and law professor, Sheila Simon, Cook County 
State’s Attorney Anita Alverez and former Chicago Inspector General David Hoffman.  
Rev. Scott Willis, whose six children died as an indirect result of the license for bribes 
scandal during the Ryan administration, also served and was a poignant reminder of the 
very real costs of corruption.  The Commission was charged with studying Illinois culture 
of corruption and returning with a report of detailed recommendations within 100 
days.xxxii 
 On January 9, 2009, the House Committee unanimously recommended 
impeachment for Blagojevich.  That action was followed the next day by a 114-1vote of 
the full House to impeach Blagojevich, making him the first governor in the state’s 
history to be impeached.  Newly sworn-in House member Deborah Mell, the Governor’s 
sister-in-law, cast the lone vote against impeachment. 
 The Illinois Senate opened the formal impeachment trial of the Governor on 
January 26th.  It was presided over by Illinois Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas 
Fitzgerald.   Rather than call witnesses, as the House did, the Senate proceeding had 
various members of the chamber outlining the evidence that had been presented.  Mr. 
Genson withdrew as the Governor’s council several days before the hearing began. 
Governor Blagojevich did not attend the trial, choosing instead to fly to New York to 
participate in a series of national news and entertainment programs in an attempt to 
bring his case directly to the public. 
 Finally on January 30, 2009 less than two months since the FBI appeared at the 
Governor’s doorstep, the Illinois Senate voted unanimously to remove Blagojevich from 
office.   Lt. Gov. Patrick Quinn was sworn in as Governor.  At this point, the work to 
restore public confidence in state government began in full with the General Assembly, 
the new Governor, his Reform Commission, other advocates and the media all pushing 
in slightly different directions. 
 The Illinois Reform Commission, also known as the Collins Commission, got off 
to a fast start.  The group held their first public meeting on January 22nd and announced 
an ambitious agenda with the subject matter including transparency in government; 
procurement policies; campaign finance reform; redistricting; enforcement and inspiring 
better government.  The 15-member commission divided into teams to address the 
broad agenda. The Commission, with strong support from Collin’s law firm Perkins Coie, 
traveled the state hearing testimony and reviewing best practices in government.  From 
the start their work was thoughtful, careful and comprehensive - perhaps, too 
comprehensive for the taste of the Illinois General Assembly. 
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 Almost in direct response to the far-reaching agenda of the Collins Commission, 
the General Assembly established a Joint Committee on Government Reform, which 
was co-chaired by House Speaker Michael Madigan and Senate President John 
Cullerton, who had replaced Emil Jones, who had not sought reelection in 2008.  The 
formation of this special committee appeared for all practical purposes an attempt to 
wrest the reform agenda from the Collins Commission.  The announced agenda of the 
Joint Committee featured a laundry list of topics, including transparency in government; 
government waste; the Compensation Act; procurement and pension reform; and the 
role and effectiveness of the Inspectors General and ethics commissions. Notably 
absent from the list of topics it planned to address was the issue of campaign finance 
reform. 
 In a meeting with the editorial board of the Daily Herald on February 1, 2009 
Senate President John Cullerton stated that he thought Illinois' wide-open campaign 
finance system was just fine repeating the mantra of lawmakers who have long refused 
contribution limits:  disclosure, disclosure, disclosure. Cullerton also insisted that what 
former Gov. Rod Blagojevich was accused of doing -- and what ex-Gov. George Ryan 
was convicted of doing – were aberrations of Illinois politics and not the norm or a 
process tempted by such a wide-open fundraising system." We don't do that," Cullerton 
said of lawmakers and corruption. "I don't do that. No one I know in government does 
that."xxxiii 
 Cullerton’s publicly stated unwillingness to address what the Collins Commission 
and most other reform advocates believed was the most fundamental and systemic 
component of Illinois’ problems galvanized the reform community.  In the wake of a 
scandal the likes of which Illinois had never seen before and with a trial still on the 
horizon, it was an unprecedented time for action and for the first time there actually 
appeared to be a window of opportunity to advance the long shut down issue of money 
in Illinois politics. 
 While the Reform Commission and the Joint Committee proceeded with their 
efforts a new reform-focus advocacy group was coming together, eventually know as 
CHANGE Illinois.  CHANGE stands for the Coalition for Honest and New Government 
Ethics. The principal architects of the new group held some initial exploratory meetings 
in January of 2009.  The participants included traditional government reformers, 
business leaders, attorneys, and grassroots community leaders, people of faith and 
labor representatives.  From the outset it was clear that this was a different 
configuration of leaders representing power, expertise and diverse constituencies who 
had never sat together at the reform table. Motivated by the ongoing spectacle of 
Blagojevich, the real and increasingly apparent fiscal costs of government 
mismanagement and the belief that putting Illinois back on track was tied to introducing 
a system of campaign contribution limits, these strange bedfellows formed the CHANGE 
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coalition.xxxiv 
 The CHANGE coalition was largely spearheaded by George Ranney Jr., 
President and CEO of Metropolis Strategies and senior counsel to the Chicago law firm 
of Mayer Brown LLP and Peter Bensinger, President and CEO of Bensinger Dupont. 
The late Larry Hansen of the Joyce Foundation provided behind-the-scenes guidance 
and motivation. It did not come together easily.  There were some who initially shied 
from contribution limits on philosophical grounds and others who felt that it took the 
spotlight off problems related to Illinois’ fundamental budgetary instability.  Even when 
galvanized and unified by events like the Blagojevich scandal, coalitions are notoriously 
difficult to manage. And groups in competition for funding view each other warily even 
when the collaborative path appears the quickest way to a common goal.  In the case of 
CHANGE, the bringing together of organizations and businesses from so many fields 
introduced certain sensibility clashes—how business is conducted and decisions are 
made in a major law firm differs greatly from that in a corporation, or  a tiny non-profit.  
This “sensibility gap” was a hurdle that the coalition would find itself continually jumping.  
However, the outrage the group felt over the former Governor’s transgressions enabled 
members to transcend this wariness. 
 The CHANGE coalition developed a call to action and platform centering on 
campaign finance reform. George Ranney Jr., Deborah Harrington (the Woods Fund of 
Chicago) and Peter Bensinger were named as co-chairs.  Each had relations in the 
individual donor and foundation communities, so what had been an unfunded effort 
suddenly had resources.  In addition, it had the ear of the press.  CHANGE Illinois was 
a unique animal and thus newsworthy.  With able assistance from former Statehouse 
reporter and Springfield communications expert Jim Bray, the coalition was able to 
generate editorial support and constant press coverage.  For the most part CHANGE 
was an unstaffed coalition, so the bulk of the policy development fell to the Illinois 
Campaign for Political Reform.  On occasion ICPR and CHANGE took slightly different 
positions on relatively nuanced points, but the public face was one of unity.  Partner 
groups such as AARP and Target Area Development Corporation Illinois added large 
constituencies which had previously not been at the reform table. 
 The advocacy message of CHANGE largely mirrored those of established reform 
groups and the recommendations from the Illinois Reform Commission.  The difference 
was that CHANGE had access to the organizational capacities and constituencies of its 
members that it could put to work in support of limits.  For reasons that remain unclear, 
the General Assembly took offense to the Collins Commission.  Though its 
recommendations were well-researched and represented best practices, they were 
unfairly branded as outsiders who didn’t understand how government worked, thus 
making their suggestions unworthy of consideration.  The General Assembly’s view was 
because lawmakers had formed their own joint committee to address the issues raised 
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by the Blagojevich scandal, they had no need for an appointed commission of outsiders 
and newcomers to tell them how to conduct their business. Due to its makeup of groups 
and the leadership of individuals with a history of involvement in Springfield, CHANGE 
Illinois, while not any better liked than the Illinois Reform Commission, was treated with 
more respect and credibility.  
 With Pat Quinn moving into the governor’s office one might have thought that his 
blue-ribbon Commission would assume a more prominent platform.  However, perhaps 
due to the reality of governance or a desire to avoid confrontation Quinn subtly 
distanced himself from the Commission and its recommendations.  Lawmakers 
disregarded or rejected the bulk of the Commission’s recommendations, which enraged 
the press and the public.  It seemed lawmakers were trying, once again, to frame the 
Blagojevich scandal as another bad egg in an otherwise decent system – their tried and 
true modus operandi to avoid altering the system they controlled. If the General 
Assembly truly believed that they could avoid tackling tough ethics and campaign 
finance issues in the wake of the removal of a sitting governor on extreme violations of 
the public trust, they were mistaken. 
 Such was the outcry that by March 2009, President Cullerton was forced to eat 
his words and add campaign finance to the Joint Committee’s agenda.  On March 16th 
and 17th 2009 the Joint Committee held hearings on campaign reform finance.  National 
and Illinois experts testified and a multiplicity of views was presented.   
 CHANGE’s three co-chairs represented the coalition and presented arguments 
on the need for campaign limits.  Canary, who gave testimony similar to what she had 
presented in the Blagojevich hearings, represented ICPR as well.  While her testimony 
had been embraced in the contest of the impeachment hearing, the message that a 
comprehensive system of contribution limits should be applied to all candidates and 
contributors in Illinois elections was met with scorn from lawmakers on the Committee, 
who would be affected by such a system. The dissimilarity between the treatment of the 
CHANGE co-chairs, established leaders new to the reform game, and Canary and other 
deep-rooted reformers, was evidenced by the tone taken by lawmakers in committee.  
Unwittingly, this paved the way for CHANGE to play good cop while the traditional 
reformers again took the role of bad cops – with both sides working in relative harmony 
to press for limits. 
 The Blagojevich scandal and public outrage, critical press of Illinois government’s 
reputation again being sullied, the Illinois Reform Commission, and relentless advocacy 
from CHANGE and others were ultimately enough to do what reform advocates had 
been struggling to do for three decades—get campaign finance reform on the public 
agenda and make it seem viable.  CHANGE Illinois played a big role in making this 
happen.  The CHANGE coalition had both constituents and resources that far exceeded 
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what the traditional reformers had previously been able to muster.  CHANGE held press 
conferences and a rally, took out advertising, effectively used social media, and 
established a toll free number to attract supporters and connect them with their 
lawmakers.  The coalition fought on numerous fronts, but most successfully before the 
state’s newspaper editorial boards.  Traveling to all corners of the state to lay out the 
case for limits, the coalition racked up significant and forceful editorial support. This 
ensured the goal being pushed at the Capitol was also being forcefully made in the 
districts.  Legislators may have at times felt that they were in an echo chamber. 
 There were several legislative vehicles for moving reform forward.  Chicago 
Democratic Representative Harry Osterman had sponsored House Bill 24 in previous 
years and it was reintroduced.  The bill was modeled on the system of federal limits, 
with additional disclosure and enforcements designed to address flaws that had become 
apparent in the federal system.  For those in the reform community, HB 24 was close to 
model legislation.  But it was also stuck in the House Rules Committee and unlikely to 
see the light of day.   
 The inside negotiation process began with numerous compromise drafts and 
numerous meetings. The Governor was directly prevailed upon to forcefully back limits 
and the public financing of judicial campaigns—planks that both the Reform 
Commission and the CHANGE coalition endorsed.  Ultimately HB 7, an elections shell 
bill introduced in January and passed by the House without content, would be amended 
in the Senate with a campaign finance reform proposal written by the Democratic 
legislative leaders. While still in the Senate, House sponsorship of the bill was 
transferred to Speaker Madigan. Once this bill got moving, it moved very fast.  An 
amendment written by the Democratic leaders was adopted by the Senate Executive 
Committee and passed by the Senate, all in one day - May 28th.  The following day, the 
House Republicans attempted a parliamentary maneuver to free their preferred bill, HB 
24, from the House Rules Committee and on to the House floor where it could be acted 
on.  Although, an unprecedented 13 Democrats joined the 48 House Republicans in 
calling for its release, the supermajority of votes needed were not there to override the 
Speaker and bring the bill to the floor.   
 After this failure, HB 7 as amended was the only vehicle left on the table in the 
waning hours of the session.  The bill was complex and contained myriad loopholes and 
exemptions to contribution limits that rendered the proposal meaningless for the 
purpose of reducing the appearance or opportunity for private campaign money to 
corrupt government.  Reformers found themselves in the odd position of testifying 
against a limits bill after having fought so long and hard to get one on the floor. The 
amended proposal was practically as hollow as the empty shell that originally passed 
the House, to the disgust and disappointment of reformers hungry for substance, not 
sham. Reform groups were unanimous in their opposition to this legislation. 
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Representatives of ICPR, CHANGE, and even the Illinois Reform Commission, filed 
witness slips in opposition to HB 7. Governor Quinn appeared in person at the hearing 
to voice his support for HB 7. 
 In spite of the united front of opposition of reform groups, HB 7 passed the House 
on May 31and was sent to the Governor.  With the support of Quinn, who had jettisoned 
his own blue-ribbon commission by testifying in support of the plan during the rushed 
committee process, Illinois was set to put contribution limits into state law. The fear of 
the reform groups was that the system of contribution limits adopted by the General 
Assembly might in fact be worse than having no limits at all. The enactment of such 
window-dressing legislation seemed likely to give lawmakers political cover and 
terminate reformers’ hope for meaningful campaign finance reform in the near future. 
ICPR and CHANGE asked the Campaign Legal Center, a national campaign finance 
group, and the Chicago law firm of Jenner and Block to analyze HB 7. The legal team 
identified a number of flaws in the legislation including several constitutionally suspect 
provisions. 
 Once the legislation was sent to Governor Quinn’s desk, advocacy and public 
outreach efforts were redirected to his office. The Governor began feeling the weight of 
this pressure almost immediately. Upon the bill’s passage, newspaper editorial boards 
across the state labeled the legislation phony reform and called on the Governor to use 
his veto pen. CHANGE and ICPR sent the governor an open letter asking him to issue a 
full or amendatory veto. 
In response to these efforts, Quinn’s office contacted ICPR to request model 
amendatory veto language, should the governor pursue that course of action.  
Language drawing heavily from HB 24, the gold standard campaign finance bill that had 
died in the House Rules Committee was provided. 
 Legislative leaders began feeling the pressure, too, so negotiation began on 
parallel tracks. Senate President Cullerton and Senator Don Harmon, the Senate 
sponsor of HB 7 requested a meeting with ICPR and CHANGE to discuss the 
legislation. Meetings were also held with Senate Republican Leader Christine Radogno 
and the Speaker's senior staff.  These meetings resulted in the drafting of new 
campaign finance legislation, designed to serve as veto session trailer bills that would 
clean up and refine HB 7 if it were to be signed into law. While differences remained, 
options seemed to be opening up and things were moving in the right direction. 
 Those negotiations were ongoing when on Aug. 27 Gov. Quinn vetoed the HB 7, 
despite calling the proposal “landmark” legislation during a Senate committee just a few 
months earlier. Now everyone seemed to agree that the bill was severely flawed. 
Representatives of the reform community along with the four legislative leaders joined 
the governor in a public veto ceremony that had an almost celebratory feeling to it. 
Quinn said he decided to veto the legislation because of the objections from Illinois 
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residents and reformers. Democratic leaders Madigan and Cullerton said they 
requested Quinn veto the legislation because they felt they were making progress on 
creating a new bill, based on the input from ICPR and the CHANGE coalition. At the 
veto ceremony, Quinn told the public that he had secured a firm commitment from all 
four legislative leaders to work with all interested parties to create a new campaign 
finance bill in time for the October veto session.  
 Following the veto of HB 7, the reform coalition began meeting directly with 
President Cullerton and his reform point person, Senator Don Harmon, as well as 
members of the House Democratic staff. The coalition continued to face resistance from 
the legislative leaders on campaign contribution limits, especially in regards to 
restrictions for party leaders. By mid-September, frustrated by the failure to get a firm 
proposal from the Democratic legislative leaders or the Governor, CHANGE had 
submitted draft legislation to House and Senate leaders. To keep up momentum, 
CHANGE held a press conference reaffirming its call for reform, sent letters to state 
legislators, continued to meet with legislative leadership and began running Chicago-
area newspaper ads.  
 As the fall veto session began, there was no acceptable proposal that emerged 
as a basis for final negotiations with all parties.  The CHANGE coalition and their reform 
allies took up (sanctioned) residence in the now empty Lt. Governor’s Office and used it 
as the base of their campaign. Having a war room in the Capitol was a huge logistical 
plus as the pace grew frenetic with an almost constant stream of meetings with the 
Governor, the legislative leaders, staff and other key players.  Memos, proposals and 
counter proposals flew back and forth almost around the clock. 
 Democrats, who held majorities in both chambers, made it clear that the 
reformers’ attempts to conduct bipartisan negotiations were a non-starter during the 
veto session.  This effectively cut the Republicans out of the loop.  In addition, while the 
Governor’s Office had its Chief of Staff, Jerry Stermer, at the table during negotiations, 
Governor Quinn did not play an active role.  As a result, there was no internal champion 
for campaign finance reform at the table.  Canary and Ranney represented the reform 
commission in the negotiations.  Both Speaker Madigan and President Cullerton 
participated in direct negotiating sessions, along with House Majority Leader Barbara 
Flynn Currie and Senator Dan Harmon. They were joined in the room by a host of 
legislative legal staff.  The negotiations were bare-knuckled and pragmatic.  For differing 
reasons, the players all knew that they had to emerge with something, but the gulf 
between them remained large. 
 At this point, the pressure of the ticking clock was felt.  The veto session 
consisted of six official session days during a two-week period. Failure to act before the 
end of the veto session meant no action would be taken before January, a two month 
delay when public pressure and interest might have dissolved. In addition, the specter 
of a major Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United case was looming.  
Reformers, and almost certainly the legislative leaders, were quietly aware of the 
direction the Court was expected to go in Citizens United.  The reformers believed that if 
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the court moved in the direction it was signaling - unlimited independent expenditure 
funded by unlimited contributions from corporate entities as well as individuals - that the 
incentive for the legislative leaders to return to the negotiating table in the spring would 
be gone. As such, they felt that a bill had to be agreed upon during the veto session if 
limits were to become law in Illinois. 
 Both sides made numerous compromises. Significant achievements for the 
reform community in the ultimately agreed-upon bill including increased disclosure of 
contributions, expenditures, and independent expenditures; tighter enforcement 
including campaign fund audits; and contribution limits at levels lower than the original 
proposal by the Democratic leaders. Requiring candidates and elected officials to 
electronically file reports year-round within 2 to 5 days of receiving of any contributions 
of $1,000 or more was an historic change in campaign disclosure in Illinois. The same is 
true for the change from semi-annual to quarterly for the filing of comprehensive, 
cumulative reports. However, one major sticking point remained. The Democratic 
legislative leaders were resolute in their unwillingness to consider limits on transfers 
(contributions) from political parties to candidates.  
 It is essential to understand that the Speaker and the Senate President 
considered the legislative caucus committees that they controlled to be political party 
committees. Exempting contributions from political parties to candidates from limits 
meant the leaders would be able to fund their candidates in targeted legislative races 
with unlimited contributions from the legislative caucus committees they controlled. Both 
the Speaker and Senate President made clear their shared belief that a political party 
exists to support its candidates and the notion of party limits was a bridge too far. The 
Governor’s Office refused to commit on this issue, saying it was considering all 
positions. 
 During the first week of veto session, the Speaker publicly laid down a maker by 
presenting in the House Executive Committee with an amendment to SB 1466 which 
contained no limits on contributions from political parties to candidates. Both ICPR and 
CHANGE testified against the Speaker’s amendment in committee. The future was 
clear. If negotiations failed, HB 1466 with the Speaker’s amendment would be the bill 
going to the Governor. 
 It was clear that both time and the ability to find agreement were running out.  
During the second and final week of the session, CHANGE and ICPR leaders 
determined that they had taken their fight for comprehensive limits as far as it could go. 
The Democratic leaders were willing to accept limits on contributions from political 
parties (which by definition included legislative caucus committees) to candidates in 
primaries, but not the general election.  Either the reform groups had to take what was 
on the table or publicly oppose what would be, without a doubt, a weaker bill that the 
Democratic leaders would pass and the Governor would sign. With some reluctance, 
reform community representatives testified in support of SB 1466 with the compromise 
language on contribution limits before the House and Senate Executive Committees.   
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 Both Chambers approved the bill, with the final vote split along party lines.  The 
Republicans, excluded from the final negotiations felt betrayed by the final outcome. 
Political considerations may have factored into the Republican caucuses’ decision as 
well, given the high public profile of the contribution limits push and with eyes looking 
toward the 2010 general election, now just a year away.  The Democratic leadership 
had gone far further on limits than seemed possible one year earlier, since the court of 
public opinion had forced their hands.  The reformers felt as though the clock had run 
out on them.  Without the Governor’s championing a stronger bill and fearful of the 
impact of the pending Citizens United case, they felt they had taken negotiations as far 
as they could go.   
 Reaction to the passage of SB 1466 was mixed. Some in the press, particularly 
the Chicago Tribune, railed against it, contending that adopting limits on private money 
contributions while failing to put limits on contributions from political parties and the 
legislative caucus committees had actually increased the power of the legislative 
leaders. xxxv  Others in the press and reform advocates who had not participated in the 
negotiation saw it as great progress, though incomplete. Long-time observers and 
participants in Illinois politics who had not been engaged in the battle had a different 
reaction. They were stunned that contribution limits had become law in Illinois. The state 
once branded the “Wild, Wild West” of campaign finance, and one of only a handful of 
holdout states that failed to act in the years (now decades) since Watergate, had 
contribution limits. 
 On December 9, 2009, a year to the day after FBI agents had arrested former 
Governor Blagojevich, Governor Pat Quinn signed SB 1466 the limits bill into law. 
Unlike the summer’s veto of HB 7, the legislative leaders did not attend. Most provisions 
of the law, including contribution limits, took effect Jan. 1, 2011, so as to avoid throwing 
a wrench into the current election cycle and to give the Illinois State Board of Elections 
time to prepare to implement the new rules. In fact, the unanticipated retirement of 
Richard M. Daley meant that a high-profile and costly mayoral election was underway 
when the law came on line.    
           Reform advocates publicly vowed not to give up the fight on party limits and 
indeed fought on, but everyone knew that as fury over Blagojevich receded in the public 
mind, the intensity of the campaign finance battle would diminish.  What was still 
unknown at that point was just how dramatically the Citizens United ruling would 
redefine the terms of the campaign finance debate. 
 
 
Section 4 – Lesson Learned: Enacting Political Reform in Illinois 
 As the case studies demonstrate there is no one clear route to reform. To 
paraphrase Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, just like a crisis, a scandal is a terrible thing 
to waste.  However, corruption alone, especially in scandal weary Illinois does not 
always lead to systemic change. Paradoxically, responding to a scandal by dealing with 
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one bad apple can actually stop the momentum toward systemic reform. 
 
 In developing a reform strategy the equation is complex.  The problem must be 
defined and a fitting solution that draws on best practices and complies with the law 
must be offered, without losing all appeal to those who must enact it.  It is essential to 
compete with political actors, organized interest, the press, and the public for space on 
the public policy agenda.  The motivations of key actors must be understood, while their 
potential pressure points are identified.  A narrative must be developed which is both 
easy to understand and compelling, but does not oversell.  The public must be engaged 
and encouraged to speak out.  There must be consequences or at least the perception 
that there are consequences for inaction. And then you have to get lucky. The status 
quo is a powerful force and enacting political reform often means changing the rules of 
the game that produced the status quo. 
 
Reform as Policy Change 
 
 There are similarities between lobbying for political reform and lobbying for a new 
fee on direct TV cable providers. What is the message? What is the public policy 
argument? Do you engage the legislative leaders, fight them, or try to work around 
them? Does it help or hurt to have the issue perceived as partisan? Can you build 
general good will in the legislature over the long term that will facilitate achieving a 
short-term specific goal? Do you engage in public activities to bring outside pressure on 
the legislature or do you work on the inside, as far away from press scrutiny as 
possible? Most of these questions are universal. 
 
 However, there is a fundamental difference between systematic political reform 
and the issue of a fee for a private industry. A fee for a private industry is a change in a 
portion of a policy status quo. Political reform requires changes in the rules of the game 
under which elected officials, interest groups, and political parties operate. Any change 
in the rules of the game poses a threat, or at least uncertainty, to those who hold power 
and those who benefit from all of the policy biases that are part of the status quo. 
Negative reactions can be based in the specifics of a particular proposal or a general 
fear of unintended consequences. Political reformers are often taken aback by the lack 
of enthusiasm, indifference, and outright hostility that is generated by what appears to 
the reformers to be greatly needed, common sense, good-government improvement in 
the political process.  
 
 To be a successful reformer, one must have a realistic understanding of the 
concerns that reform proposals create. It is a mistake to underestimate the legitimate 
concerns that changes in the rules of the game generate for those who are part of the 
political process. It is a mistake to assume that any opposition or reluctance is rooted in 
evil motives. It is also a mistake to under-estimate the resistance and resolve of those in 
power to changes that threaten their power. The resistance by the legislative leaders 
who are in the majority to a system of comprehensive contribution limits that would 
fundamentally challenge their power over elections and policy-making has been 
constant and unwavering since the issue was publicly raised by the report of the Simon-
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Stratton commission. At the end of the 2009 battle over the campaign finance bill, that 
position was as non-negotiable as it was in 1996. All of the changes in political culture, 
all of the reform victories, and all of the political scandal had not altered the dynamic 
enough to make comprehensive limits on how legislative leaders used their money in 
general elections an achievable goal. Maybe a popular, effective Governor engaged on 
behalf of reform could have altered the outcome, but we will never know. To quote Clint 
Eastwood in the movie Magnum Force, “A man’s got to know his limitations.” 
 
Reform as Politics 
 You cannot achieve political reform without engaging in politics. The American 
political system was designed by the framers of the US Constitution to be a very messy, 
time-consuming, difficult process. They trusted in majority rule and a democratic 
process to prevail over the tyranny of the minority. They tried to protect basic rights 
through the Bill of Rights. But faced with the prospect of tyranny by the majority – the 
fact that majorities can do bad things – they chose to create a governmental system 
where the fragmentation of power makes it is difficult to get things done quickly, if at all, 
unless you have overwhelming consensus or are willing to compromise.  Reformers 
who do not like politics - who are offended by the process – are rarely successful and 
continually frustrated. “Playing politics” has a very negative connotation. But that well-
desired negativity comes from how politics is being played, not from the nature of the 
politics itself. Engaging (playing) in politics is the essence of democratic self-
government. Most successful reformers understand and respect the political process. It 
probably helps if you actually like politics. An outcome that is not legitimately achieved 
does not have to be respected and much of the agenda of political reform is directed at 
ensuring the legitimacy of the political process. But having a political process with 
integrity and great quality of opportunity to participate does not guarantee “good” 
outcomes. Sometimes you lose. If the fight was fair, then the only recourse you have is 
to figure out what went wrong and how to do better in the future. When reformers fail, 
they fail at politics. They do not fail because of politics. 
 
The Role of Scandal and the Limits of Scandal as a Way to Reform 
 
 One thing that jumps out from examining the time line for reform and the case 
studies presented in the previous section is the direct, positive relationship between 
political scandal and political reform. A high-profile scandal often provides momentum 
for reform in Illinois. The linkage can be direct: stop Blagojevich from selling the state to 
the highest bidder by adopting pay-to-play. It can also be indirect. If there is going to be 
an ethics bill passed in the wake of the Ryan scandal, there is an opportunity to promote 
reform measures that solve “problems” that were not part of scandal, but as still 
legitimate issues worthy of consideration. Relatives of lobbyists serving on state boards 
and commissions did not become a concern as a result of the Ryan scandal. It was not 
on anyone’s radar. But it became part of the 2003 ethics law.  Scandals are 
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opportunities. 
 
 While political scandals are useful opportunities, they have two limitations as a 
way to reform. First, scandals are high-profile events that involve good guys and bad 
guys. They fit into a narrative that the system is sound except for the occasional bad 
apple. This mind set makes getting beyond the bad behavior to the factors that caused 
it difficult, as an extension, to achieve substantive reform. Was Blagojevich just a 
corrupt individual or was he the logical conclusion of a political system that values self-
interest and power over the public good and the public interest? The answer is both, but 
assuming that corruption is a random occurrence makes it unnecessary to ask if there 
are systemic problems that produce corruption. Second, scandals do not occur on a 
regular basis and may not involve the most critical issues that need to be addressed by 
political reform. Scandal-based reform is by definition reactive and episodic. It is not a 
substitute for a building a strong institutional capacity and a proactive agenda.  
 
The Intransigence of the Illinois Political Culture 
 The essence of Illinois politics is power, winning and control of it in the pursuit of 
individual self-interest. It is a largely non-ideological politics that recognizes no public 
interest beyond the aggregate of individual self-interest. Politics is the business of 
professionals, not amateurs. There is a mindset among public officials that campaign 
contribution records, lobbyist expenditure reports, and public documents “belong” to the 
political actors, not the general public. While not highly ideological, the political culture is 
highly partisan with parties functioning as mechanisms of organization and control. The 
attitudes, opinions, and beliefs of political culture are learned. They are fixed in the short 
term. Achieving the goals of political reform requires changing political culture, but that 
is a long term process. 
 The resistance to making campaign finance records accessible to the general 
public that held sway from 1974 to 1997 was rooted in a belief that knowing who 
contributed to campaigns was the business of the politicians and the political parties, 
not citizens or the news media. When the State Board of Elections began publishing 
summary reports of contribution data in the mid-1990s, officials from the office were 
challenged by lawmakers in a legislative budget hearing for exceeding their authority 
and mission. The legislature did not embrace increased disclosure in 1997 and 1998 
because it was the right thing to do or because it was in the public interest. They 
acquiesced and offered it in the face of the threat of greater reform – contribution limits. 
When the potential of mandatory electronic disclosure became clear there were 
immediate attempts to make electronic filing permissive. Maximizing public access to 
campaign finance data is not the logical expression of Illinois’ political culture. The 
continuing resistance among public officials to granting maximum access to public 
documents through the Freedom of Information Act and the resulting compliance 
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problems at all levels of the state are rooted in the same set of values and beliefs about 
whose interests should be served by government.  
 At its worst, Illinois’ political culture engenders a sense of entitlement among 
public officials. Public documents are “my documents.” Lobbyists buying meals and 
drinks for legislators and legislators handing out legislative scholarships are seen as 
part of the natural order of things. In this mind set government exists to serve the self-
interests of those in power. Former Governor Blagojevich was recorded on a federal 
wiretap giving voice to this sense of entitlement when he talked about what his official 
power to appoint a replacement to the US Senate meant to him, "I mean, I've got this 
thing and it's f***ing golden. And I'm just not giving it up for f***ing nothing."xxxvi From a 
strategic standpoint, it is imperative for reformers to recognize that the Illinois political 
culture provides a context which frames everything that takes place. 
The Importance of Legislative Leaders 
 Power in the Illinois General Assembly is centralized in the hands of the four 
legislative leaders. They dominate the process in Springfield. They have control over all 
legislative staff. They control the structure and the procedures. In relative terms, 
individual members and the committee structure are very weak. Because they control 
the gavel and the flow of business in the legislative process, the Speaker and the 
Senate President in particular exercise great power in their respective chambers. The 
leaders also dominate legislative elections through their control of money to fund 
competitive races and their control over political campaign organizations made up of 
legislative staff employees on leave from the legislature.  
 In the fight over pay-to-play legislation, the Senate President was able to block a 
bill that had passed the House without opposition and had 49 out of 59 Senators as co-
sponsors. Public funding for judicial campaigns has gained very little traction in the 
Illinois House because of the opposition of Speaker Madigan, who is also chairman of 
the state Democratic Party, even though the Senate passed such a plan on a bipartisan 
vote three times. Control over judicial elections is an essential element in party and 
ward politics in the City of Chicago. The partisan balance of the Illinois Supreme Court 
has been critical in the outcome of some of their decisions on public policy issues and 
redistricting. Public financing of judicial elections would alter the process and add 
uncertainty to the outcomes. Even the notoriety of being the home to the most 
expensive ($9.4 million) state Supreme Court race in US history  - funded by insurance 
companies, the US Chamber of Commerce, and major trial lawyer firms in 2004 - has 
not been sufficient to get a judicial public financing bill out of any House committee.  
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 Any effort to move reform legislation through the Illinois legislature has to take 
the power of the legislative leaders into account. The leaders do not care about 
everything that comes before the legislature and they do not always win. But they 
almost always win on issues they do care about.xxxvii 
The Importance of Political Champions 
 Having an individual who can be a strong political champion for the advocate’s 
message can imbue it with legitimacy and open doors which might otherwise remain 
closed. However, having an insider as a champion can also present challenges.  A body 
at the table is not the same thing as a committed ally.  Likewise, one must be able to 
discern the difference between the true ally and the individual who is co-opting reform 
rhetoric to fight his or her own battle.  The difficulty can arise in maintaining control over 
content of a legislative proposal.  While all legislation is compromise, there is a very real 
danger of being hijacked or abandoned by those who appear to the external world as 
your partners, but are pursuing very different political agendas. 
  In 1998, the driving agent was not a good government group; rather the external 
catalyst was an individual - Senator Paul Simon - who had the stature to bring the 
players to the table. In 1998, reform groups were delivered a full package and merely 
had to push the Simon effort past the finish line.  This process, like all others, involved a 
series of tradeoffs. The process was thoughtful, but it was also closed. Reforms were 
virtually guaranteed, but their parameters were controlled by political powers. 
Dependent as it was upon the prominence of the late Senator Simon, it has also been a 
process that has not been successfully replicated.  It is very difficult to identify a current 
political actor who would could step into this role and win the trust and commitment of 
players from both inside and outside the system, let alone cross the partisan divides. 
The 2008 success was also reliant upon an internal champion -- Comptroller Dan 
Hynes. The value of having a committed internal champion cannot be overstated. 
Hynes, by adopting the pay to play policy for his own office and later by making public a 
searchable database linking contractors and contributions, kept a spotlight on the issue 
and defied critics who contended that the policy was unworkable or unnecessary. He 
had access to the news media and brought legitimacy to the message that favoring 
contributor contractors was bad fiscal management as well as corrupt. Hynes was also 
uniquely positioned to advance the proposal. He was a constitutional officer who had 
been elected statewide. He had access to the legislature, but was not of the legislature.  
Likewise, with Hynes assuming the high ground and keeping the message consistent, 
reformers were more able to play the role of tough cops without losing access to the 
negotiating table. 
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By contrast, the 2003 campaign shows the peril of having an alleged champion 
who is actually trying to co-opt all sides.  Rod Blagojevich swept into the governor’s 
office on a wave of reform and that was the mantle he wore in the public fight for this 
legislation.  While it would later be revealed that he was exploiting his office for personal 
gain from the start of his administration, in 2003 he used his bully pulpit to stir up 
populist hunger for reform. Blagojevich had little affection for the nuances of policy, but 
hungered for the media spotlight. He understood the political value of reform and also 
saw how it could be used to limit the political power of his rivals. If Blagojevich is 
understood as a catalyst for the 2003 effort, perhaps the most apt metaphor is the sand 
in the oyster. He was an internal irritant. 
In 2003 the challenge for reformers was to keep the external message consistent 
and to keep the internal process moving despite the power plays that were taking place. 
It proved a challenging environment with which to promote best practices and develop a 
public legitimacy for the reform. While much good came out of the 2003 legislation, in 
some respects it was in spite of and not because of the key actors involved. Reform 
organizations had the tricky and nuanced task of having to separate positive 
governmental reform from so-called reforms put forward that would advance a personal 
agenda, but offered little public benefit. This was particularly challenging, as the process 
unfolded in the public arena. The narrative put forward by the new Governor was of a 
committed, young leader fighting against the status quo to rid Illinois of corruption. The 
problem was that from the inside it was readily apparent that the narrative wasn't true. 
Neither the new Governor nor those who benefited from the status quo were particularly 
interested in the serious public policy of change. 
While 1998 and 2008 illustrate the importance of a strong champion and 2003 
highlights the dangers of a faux champion, the fight for limits was largely without an 
internal champion.  Several legislators were supportive and spoke out.  After his 
summer veto of the first campaign finance bill, Governor Pat Quinn could have taken 
the lead on producing a better law. Instead, he stayed on the sidelines, as he had 
earlier in the process.  He both distanced himself from the excellent work of his own 
Commission and failed to provide a forceful voice at the negotiating table where he 
could have influenced the shaping of a more robust limits package.  For whatever 
reason - the state’s enormous fiscal problems, the challenges of getting a new 
administration up and running, or other priorities – the Governor was on the sidelines 
during the negotiations that shaped the final limits agreement. The lack of an internal 
advocate significantly weakened the reformers’ hand. The Governor was the only inside 
actor who could have potentially made a difference in the reformer’s battle to block the 
will of the legislative leaders and secure a stronger and perhaps more expansive bill. 
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The Importance of Data and Policy Analysis 
Public policy is only as good as the data and analysis backing it up.  One makes 
sound policy choices by being a student of best practices and the law, but also by 
understanding the particulars of the system and the political culture that one works 
within.  Policy-making must be made based on both aspirations and reality.  In setting 
the level of limits, for instance, it is imperative to understand existing patterns.  What 
types and levels of contributions are common for rank and file members?  Where does 
the pattern deviate?  What is the role of legislative leaders in financing legislative 
elections? Where do the problems lie?  An appropriate system of contribution limits for 
New Hampshire might have little relevance in Illinois. 
Understanding how the current election system works and appreciating that 
candidates need resources to campaign allows an advocate to act as an honest broker 
and to demonstrate that a proposal is not designed to starve the system, but to 
constrain the excesses at the margins.  Using a data based approach also allows 
reformers to largely remove the issue from the partisan context that always exists and 
address system consequences and patterns.  This approach also builds external 
credibility with the news media. 
It is important to be able to speak to both legislators and the press from a fact 
based position.  This makes policy arguments more difficult to disavow.  It also provides 
the advocate with a consistent and non-partisan framework within which to work.  Also, 
as with most things, attention to detail matters.  There are numerous examples of 
election reforms being borrowed from other states lock, stock and barrel—incorporating 
their election calendars, nuances and sometimes even references to their unique 
institutions.  Sloppy advocacy is a nonstarter.  It doesn’t advance your position or win 
you credibility in the court of public opinion.  The basic fact remains the same, just like 
any effective lobbyist, the reformer must understand how a bill actually becomes a law 
in Illinois. 
Increasingly, reform advocates must be a student of the law.  They must look to 
the rulings of the US Supreme Court, but also keep abreast of legal developments in 
other states.  While there is little value in advancing a proposal that is patently 
unconstitutional, caution is also warranted on the other side.  One does not always 
know where the courts are going or how they will interpret various refinements to 
proposals.  Reform organizations, which generally do not have the luxury of a legal 
department, need to forge alliances with private law firms and with legal think tanks.  To 
the extent possible, it is important to analyze the viability of a proposal in advance and 
to think through how it might be defended on the back end. 
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The Importance of Building Institutional Capacity 
 As the case studies show, reforms are often pushed forward by scrappy 
organizations high in commitment, but lacking in resources. One of the lessons learned 
is that reformers often take the routes to reform that they do by necessity rather than a 
strategic choice because they are starved of resources. Not utilizing cutting edge 
communications techniques or not bringing in expert witnesses are not decisions made 
by choice. The availability of resources from the CHANGE coalition in 2009 allowed 
reformers to significantly increase their effectiveness through the use of organizing and 
communications techniques. This made possible a campaign that had by necessity to 
be completed in a year’s time. 
 It is important for the reform community to have an honest dialogue with funders 
about the need for ongoing resources and support for networking opportunities within  
the wider reform community in neighboring states and nationally.  Resources that flow in 
during the heat of a policy campaign can very well tip the balance toward victory.  
However, it is equally important that resources be there during more fallow periods to 
ensure proper implementation of the laws on the books, to prevent backsliding and to 
allow reformers to keep the principles and values of reform front and center.  Too often 
reformers pursue low hanging fruit, but are not in a position to effectively pursue the 
more profound systemic changes, which might be transformative.  Reform is a 
marathon, not a sprint.  It is not something that can be accomplished then forgotten. A 
legislative victory that isn’t followed through on the rule-making side can be a lost 
opportunity or even counter-productive.  It is not glamorous, or even newsworthy, but for 
advocates to be true stewards of their mission they must have the capacity to ensure 
that their legislative victories are actually meaningful and not misconstrued in the policy 
implementation stage. 
 A lack of financial resources does not, however, translate into a complete lack of 
capacity.  Alliances can be forged with national groups and legal experts to supplement 
the work of advocates with boots on the ground.  Communication skills can be learned.  
Coalitions can be forged.  Data can be accessed.  What is important is placing a value 
on these components and devoting time to thoughtfully building them into a reform 
strategy.   
The Importance of Educating and Engaging the News Media 
 Most legislators want to be responsive to and representative of what they believe 
their constituents want.  Legislators also have policy positions and a sense of what is 
needed for the good of the entire state. But one cannot be an effective legislator if you 
do not get elected. If you want to bring pressure to bear on the legislature from the 
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outside you have to make them hear the voices of a disaffected public. Unlike teachers, 
bankers, Realtors, and unions; reform groups rarely have organized members in every 
legislative district who can build relationships with legislators. An alternative way to build 
a presence outside of Springfield that has an impact of policy making is to work through 
local and statewide news media. An effective media strategy is important to some 
degree for any group trying to effect policy change. For reform advocates it is 
indispensable.  
 Reporters and editorial boards are interested in news. Their business requires 
content. To make legislators and statewide officials hear voices that tell your story, you 
have to make news. You have to do things and to make proposals that get written 
about, broadcast, and blogged. How those stories get presented is a function of what 
reporters and editorial boards understand about reform issues. Educating reporters and 
editorial boards is an ongoing task that requires seeking them out to make your case 
and build relationships.  It also requires responding to requests for information and 
interviews. Every press contact is an opportunity to educate reporters about your 
issues.  Every press contact is an opportunity to get your perspective in the news story. 
The more you are seen as being accessible, knowledgeable, and trustworthy the more 
reporters will contact you. There are times when the demands of the press can be 
overwhelming. Responding to reporters about the arrest of former Governor Blagojevich 
became more than a full-time job. But every interview was an opportunity to talk about 
the bigger picture and the need to reform the system that produced the Governor and 
brought him to power. And every press contact is an opportunity to build access and 
credibility for the future. If you are doing it correctly the news media will come to you as 
often as you go to them. 
 Effective media strategies help get you on the agenda and they help you shape 
policy. The story of the 2009 campaign finance law illustrates how outside pressure 
focused through the news media can be essential to achieving policy change. Without 
strong media pressure, opposition from the legislative leaders to even talking about 
campaign finance reform, let alone putting it on their agenda, might have been 
successful. Without strong media pressure the weak legislation that passed the 
legislature in the spring with the support of the Governor might have become law. 
Without strong media pressure, the legislative leaders would not have gone as far as 
they did in the final negotiations. The strong opposition to the final agreement on limits 
(with the absence of limits on contributions from leaders in the general election period) 
from many newspaper editorial boards throughout the state also demonstrates the 
complexity of the relationship between advocacy groups and the news media. While 
interactions can be mutually beneficial, they are independent actors with their own goals 
and objectives which will not always align with those of reformers. 
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The Importance of Crafting and Communicating a Message 
 The goals of the campaign finance advocate are based in principles and values. 
The courts have been clear that the primary objective of campaign finance regulation is 
to inhibit corruption and the appearance of corruption.  But what of our secondary goals:  
Are we trying to encourage political participation?  Are we trying to limit private money?  
Are we trying to encourage electoral competitiveness? These may all be worthwhile 
goals, but no one set of policies will accomplish them all.  In fact, these values may find 
themselves at cross-purposes. Policies that might make elections more competitive 
might also make them more expensive and vice versa. The policies advanced and our 
messages must communicate both the primary legal goal of campaign finance to 
diminish corruption and our vision for a more healthy vibrant democracy. 
 The courts have made the crafting of a campaign finance message infinitely 
more difficult.  By legally requiring policy to be designed to limit corruption and the 
appearance of corruption, advocates must speak to the negative.  In Illinois, where 
scandal is frequent and cynicism runs high, this is not necessarily the strongest 
message.  However, since these are the sole legitimate constitutional reasons for 
advancing campaign finance reform they must always be at the core of the message. 
 So how does one craft a message around corruption in an environment that is 
skeptical of change?  One strategy is to hammer on the very real costs of corruption.  It 
is not simply an abstract problem or an embarrassment rather it is a systemic disease, 
which has a cost, often a large cost, to the taxpayer.  It is not whether we focus on 
campaign reform or a more immediate issue such as the budget, health care or 
education.  Rather, we focus on campaign reform because it will allow us to begin to 
remove corruption from the equation and be more effective in addressing key social 
concerns.  In a state with such an extensive corruption history the message crafted 
must also focus on helping people move beyond the reality they know to imagine a 
better set of circumstances.   
 Delivering the message can be as challenging as crafting it.  In today’s world the 
channels for communication seem almost limitless.  The challenge for reformers is to 
not merely spit into the wind.  A key lesson comes in remembering the old adage that all 
politics are local.  Whether utilizing new media or conventional media, it is critically 
important to speak to people and thereby legislators where they live.  This means taking 
the message beyond Chicago and Springfield.  As important as the Chicago Tribune or 
Facebook may be, it is also essential to get to know local reporters and editorial boards 
and to identify the blogs or sites, which have particular resonance in neighborhoods and 
communities.  This can be very labor intensive as it means going to Belleville or Moline 
or Bloomington to meet with community leaders and media.  However, these personal 
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relationships and the insights they provide into the lens through which residents of those 
communities are viewing an issue are invaluable.  Personal relationships also help to 
build and add legitimacy to a media presence. 
 Political reform is not often thought of as a visual medium.  However, with 
creativity there are always opportunities to tell the story to a camera.  In addition to the 
often-tired news conference format, rallies, props and well-timed appearances outside 
of fundraisers can add visual spark to a story.  Radio, too, is a medium that shouldn’t be 
forgotten.  On a statewide basis, it offers numerous opportunities through interview, 
news and call-in programs to get the message out and to localize and personalize it.   
 Finally, social media and other new technologies must be integrated into the 
overall communication strategy. While some of these are very low or even no direct 
cost, other techniques such as 800 numbers, tele-townhalls, or software programs 
which help constituents connect directly with legislators can require a significant 
investment.  At a minimum, reform groups need to be mindful of their website.  It is their 
face to the public.  It needs to be fresh, clear and regularly updated.  All 
communications should be aimed at driving people to their website, where they should 
be encouraged to get more information about the agenda and then take action.  This 
can be done, ideally with a combination of blogs, issue briefings, e-newsletters, 
Facebook posts, tweets and the like.  For graying reformers, it can be a challenge to 
communicate on all of these platforms.  Having younger interns or junior employees 
assist in developing an integrated social media strategy can be as valuable to a 
resource starved non-profit as the services of a professional communications firm. 
The Importance of Knowing the Rules 
 Many reform organizations are 501(c)(3) organizations.  This designation 
provides them with great tax benefits but strictly limits the lobbying that a group can do 
and prohibits their directly engaging in electioneering.   
Lobbying and advocacy are related; but distinct activities.  Arguing for or against 
a bill is generally lobbying, while advocating a position on a broader question of public 
policy or producing educational materials, generally is not.  A reformer delivering 
testimony to a government committee at the invitation of a legislator is not lobbying.  
However, delivering that same testimony without invitation may be lobbying.   All 
501(c)(3) organizations may engage in a nominal amount of lobbying.  As nominal is a 
relatively undefined term, many organizations opt to file under Section H of the tax code 
which provides a clearer definition and allows them to utilize up to 20% of their 
resources on lobbying.  The question of direct lobbying grows murkier, however, as how 
it is defined by the IRS is generally quite different than how it is defined in state statute.  
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On top of this, many funders, such as foundations, prohibit direct lobbying with their 
resources.  It is important for non-profit organizations to track their activities and 
expenditures to ensure that only allowed resources are used for lobbying purposes. 
Electoral involvement is a bit clearer.  501(c)(3) groups cannot endorse 
candidates or make political contributions.  They cannot encourage their members or 
the public to vote in a specific way.  They can, however, moderate debates and with 
some important limitations produce voters’ guides to educate the public on election 
choices and candidates.  While these rules may be well known by funders, candidates 
seem to be far less aware of them and the requests for endorsements or appearances 
with candidates or supporting statements may flourish, especially at election time.  
While there are rules of thumb mainly dealing with fairness and consistency of message 
inside and outside the electoral window, reformers are encouraged to tread carefully 
and to seek advice.  The Alliance for Justice is one organization that provides resources 
on these questions.xxxviii 
Many of the activities described earlier in this paper’s case studies were 
undertaken through the joint efforts of 501(c)-(3) and 501(c)-(4) organizations.  
Contributions to 501(c)-(4) organizations are not tax-deductible, but they allow greater 
leeway with both lobbying and electioneering activities.  Some organizations, such as 
the League of Women Voters have both (c)-(3) and (c)-(4) arms, while in other cases 
coalitions are forged allowing various entities to focus on what is legally allowable. 
The Importance of Crafting Inside and Outside Strategies 
 A lobbyist trying to pass legislation to make a technical change on behalf of an 
industry may opt to focus almost solely on the Statehouse.  Reformers don’t have that 
luxury.  They must build networks, forge coalitions and educate the press and the 
public.  In other words, they must build external demand for the reforms that they 
advocate.  Without this external pressure there is little motivation for the General 
Assembly to change the rules under which they operate. 
 Coalition-building is most effective when it brings together the unexpected.  
Unlikely partners, such as business, labor, religious and civic organizations that come 
together to share a common message are very effective.  Likewise groups such as 
AARP, which has been a leader in CHANGE Illinois, are particularly powerful both for 
the sheer membership they bring, but also for demonstrating and articulating how 
systemic policy issues impact their specific agendas.   
 Reform leaders should be by nature coalition builders.  They must develop 
strategies to engage the grassroots which may involve everything from social media to 
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public speaking at venues ranging from the Rotary Club to the church hall.  Equally 
important, they must identify the so-called “grass tops”.  Who are the opinion leaders in 
Illinois?  Who are the leaders in key communities?  And why should this message 
resonate with them?  In all of this outreach a reputation for integrity and a willingness to 
deal in good faith are key.  Technology and social media are important, but personal 
networks, meetings and contacts are what open doors. 
 Coalition management is notoriously difficult.  Organizations have different 
cultures, face competing priorities and often juggle limited resources.  It is difficult to 
keep people at the table and engaged.  There is no magic formula, but clarity of 
message, a timeline and specific expectations can be helpful.  As can something as 
simple and human as remembering to recognize victory and give credit and thanks. 
 Working the legislature from the inside through face-to-face contact requires a 
similar toolbox.  Knowledge, a clear message, a consistent face and most importantly, 
honesty are the basics.  As stated previously, reform organizations often lack resources.  
They must rely on their knowledge, hard work, and reputations.  This requires 
transparency, fair factual analysis and consistency.  Legislators do not need to like you, 
but they do need to respect you. 
 To the extent possible, it is important to have an ongoing presence in Springfield.  
The individual who is at the Capitol day after day becomes the embodiment of your 
message.  They answer questions, distribute fact sheets, cajole, negotiate and build 
networks.  If your cause is not represented at the Capitol in this way it is easy to fall off 
of the agenda. 
 Developing legislative allies is also imperative.  They not only sponsor bills, they 
can provide unique insights into the larger political picture and help you to formulate 
strategy.  Finding a bill sponsor is not terribly difficult, but it also doesn’t ensure that a 
finger will be lifted to advance the proposal.  Establishing a legislative ally means 
building an honest relationship which sometimes means heeding their suggestion of 
“not now.” 
 When working within the legislature, it is critically important to understand that 
the quest for reform is ongoing.  Battles can get heated and losses are inevitable.  While 
these cannot always be handled with grace, they do require a certain amount of 
humility.  Toughness may be required, even occasional flashes of anger, but more likely 
than not you’ll have to fight another day.   
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The Importance of Winning and Losing and Being There for the Long Run 
 Political reform is about ideas and principles. In the battle to make democratic 
self-government work how do you know whether you have won or lost? In one sense 
the metrics are easy. Failing to pass public financing for Supreme Court elections is the 
same as failing to pass a fee on direct TV service providers.  Successfully putting 
contribution limits in place is the same as exempting those who shoe horses from state 
regulation. A win is a win and a loss is a loss.  But experienced players in Springfield 
know that victories can have a shelf life that expires the next time the legislature is in 
session and the getting a bill killed by a floor vote can be a step forward in achieving a 
goal that could not get a hearing in the past. 
 It is both a disadvantage and an advantage that the goals of political reform are 
long term and global. It is easier to work on a tax exemption than to restructure the 
entire tax code because you are not challenging the basic rules of the game. But 
political reform is always about the rules of the game. It is hard to accomplish. Many of 
legislative achievements in the reform area seem modest, particularly at the time. The 
breath of the goals – elections that are open and fair, transparency in all aspects of 
government, mitigating the role of money in elections and policy making, fighting 
political corruption and engendering ethical behavior in politics and government – make 
crafting comprehensive, integrated solutions difficult at best.   
  In a long-term battle you need short-term victories to keep up morale and show 
progress. In that sense there are no small victories. And if you keep your eye on the 
long-term goals, you can craft smaller victories in ways that translate into larger 
victories. Permissive electronic filing and requiring Internet access to campaign reports 
became mandatory electronic filing and searchable on-line databases of campaign 
reports, which then became quarterly reports and year-round, real-time reporting of 
large contributions. It took more than a decade, but the change from the campaign 
finance world of 1997 in Illinois to now is stunning.  Being in it for the long run allows 
you to pursue strategies that reach beyond the end of the legislative session or the next 
election. Given the nature of the goals of political reform and the resistance of the status 
quo to change, the long run is really the only option for advocates of political reform. 
 Trying to balance short-term victories and long term goals comes down to the art 
of politics. What is possible? Over time, what gets you closer to your long-term goal? At 
the end of the negotiations with the legislative leaders in 2009 there was a proposal on 
the table which expanded disclosure and enforcement and put limits on contributions of 
private money. It did not put limits on contributions from political parties and legislative 
caucus committees controlled by the legislative leaders except in primaries. Agreeing to 
support the proposal would put contribution limits in state law and achieve a publicly 
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stated goal that had been a key part of the reform agenda in Illinois since the Simon-
Stratton commission report was issued in1997.  More than twelve years of effort was on 
the line. But agreeing to support the proposal meant limits on money from legislative 
leaders and political parties would not be part of the new law. Do you take the partial 
victory and risk losing an opportunity to achieve more? Or do you walk away knowing 
that something less than what you just presented with will become law and trust that 
you can build on the momentum that got you to this point to come back and achieve 
comprehensive contribution limits? No one else can make the call. Welcome to the 
world of politics. 
 
Section 5 -Fighting the next war: Reshaping the Agenda for Political Reform  
 The task of political reform is never easy. The mountain we have to climb in 
Illinois is particularly steep. But if we understand the parameters and limitations of policy 
change and adapt strategies and techniques to the reality of a given time and a given 
situation, then we can be effective. But effective flurries of activity in the absence of a 
clear understanding and articulation of what reform means and why it is important are 
just that, flurries of activity. 
 The modern reform/good government movement in the United States took shape 
at the end of the 19th century. The movement toward voting rights, ballot access, 
governmental ethics, and government transparency has been uneven at times, but it 
has always moved forward.  
 In 1974, the linchpin of the logic of political reform was regulating and limiting 
campaign contributions and campaign spending.  The greatest perceived threat to 
“good government” and the “public interest” in the post-Watergate era was the role of 
money in politics. The Nixon scandals were seen as clear evidence by reformers that 
the unfettered, secret flow of big money into politics created threats to democratic 
government. Big, unregulated money distorted the flow and the content of information 
between citizens and candidates. Big, unregulated money gave rise to campaign 
techniques and strategies that diminished the engagement of citizens in politics and 
eroded their support for the outcomes. Big, unregulated money created conflicts of 
interest for elected officials between the desires of contributors and the desires of 
constituents, further weakening the bonds between citizens and their political system. 
Big, unregulated money created systemic corruption that went far beyond the 
weaknesses or greed of any individual.  In short, big, unregulated money threatened to 
overwhelm all the previous reform victories by creating an environment that weakened 
democratic processes and diminished the legitimacy of government in the eyes of 
citizens.  
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 In the pre-Buckley world of 1974 the path for moving the reform agenda forward 
seemed clear.  Passing legislation at the national and state level that regulated and 
limited campaign contributions and campaign spending would severely constrain the 
corrosive impact of big money on politics.  To many, the ultimate goal was the public 
funding of political campaigns because that would remove the impact of private money 
on politics by removing it from politics. These were the key legislative goals of political 
reform in 1974. This is not to suggest that voting rights, ballot access, transparency in 
government and governmental ethics were unimportant or that there was no unfinished 
business in putting them in place or making them effective. But they were viewed as a 
foundation. The big prize was campaign finance reform.  
The pre-Buckley world of 1974 is gone. Between the 1976 Buckley decision that 
struck down spending limits and the Citizens United (2010) and the McComish (2011) 
rulings, states were a veritable laboratory of democracy. Regulation schemas, public 
financing, robust disclosure, and small-donor incentive programs flourished. Consensus 
on contribution limits was at the point that the federal government and 46 of the 50 
states had adopted some type of limits, with the majority outlawing direct corporate 
contributions. Public financing systems of varying degrees had been adopted by a 
number of states. Conspicuously absent from what was occurring throughout the 
country was any action in Illinois. 
 We now live in a post-Buckley, post-Citizens United, post-SpeechNow, post-
McComish world. The cumulative effect of these Supreme Court rulings is that the 
constitutional framework for regulating and limiting money in politics has become so 
narrow that its practical impact seems almost trivial. This is not true, but the sentiment is 
shared by some supporters as well as most critics of campaign finance reform. At the 
same time, new challenges to voting rights, ballot access and government transparency 
threaten some of the most significant political reform achievements of the past half 
century. Just as alarming, the seemingly never-ending incidents of political corruption, 
petty and great, suggest that holding those involved in government – those doing the 
people’s business – to a higher ethical standard than those involved in business or in 
private life may be an unobtainable goal. In light of this, what does political reform - its 
goals, logic, and strategies – mean in 2012? And what should be the action agenda 
going forward? We need to be clear about where we are going and why.  
 A commitment to democratic self -government rests on a belief that civic 
engagement through democratic institutions is the key to achieving both the full 
potential of individual citizens and the collective benefits of a government that is 
effective, efficient, moral, and just. Citizen participation ennobles individuals, the 
institutions, and the outcomes. Democratic government cannot effectively do the 
people’s business without the informed, active participation of the people. This applies 
equally to both public elections and public policy making. The system cannot work 
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unless people participate, unless that participation is meaningful to public outcomes, 
and unless people believe that their participation is meaningful. This is an interactive, 
symbiotic relationship.  Lose any part and democratic government will exist in name 
only. A belief in democratic self-government is a hopeful, positive belief that puts its faith 
ultimately not in laws, or public or private institutions, or even written constitutions, but in 
people. In this context, political reform is about insuring and enabling acts of public 
participation, enriching the quality of public participation, and reducing or eliminating the 
threats to public participation which undermine public support for democratic self-
government.  The best means to this end may not always be clear, but the end – the 
goal – is not in question. 
 In the United States democratic self-government takes place within a 
constitutional representative democracy. Citizens participate directly in some political 
processes and indirectly in others. Citizens participate directly in elections at both the 
national and state levels. At the national level participation in lawmaking is always 
indirect. Citizens elect legislators and a president who jointly decides what becomes 
law. In some states, citizens participate directly in lawmaking through initiative 
processes as well as indirectly through electing legislators and Governors. All federal 
judges are appointed while some states elect judges, some appoint judges and some 
do both. How to structure individual participation in an area such as making laws or 
selecting judges is a question that illustrates the tradeoffs inherent in the quest for 
political reform.  
 Part of the new agenda for political reform is the old agenda for political reform. 
Political reform is still about encouraging citizen participation through passing laws 
facilitating more voter registration, more voting, and greater ballot access for candidates 
and third political parties and fighting every effort to restrict them. Political reform is still 
about enhancing the quality of citizen participation by providing access to the 
processes, decisions and the basic policy information of government through Freedom 
of Information, Open Meetings, and other open government laws. It is still about 
enhancing the quality of citizen participation through laws requiring disclosure of the 
economic interests of public officials and the activities and interests of lobbyist. The 
logic of these goals has not been called into question by the new constitutional 
framework regulating the role of money in politics or the suffocating crush of political 
corruption. The task of achieving these goals is not easy. There are always new 
challenges and we face a political culture in Illinois which is at its best indifferent and at 
it worse antagonist to these values. Like the price of freedom, the price of reform is 
constant vigilance.   
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We need to dramatically increase the amount of information we have about 
public transactions and the private interests of public officials and public employees. We 
need to dramatically improve public access to the information on budgets and 
expenditures and program evaluations. This would enhance the quality of citizen 
participation and reduce threats to citizen support for the legitimacy of the government 
and the political process by revealing conflicts of interests in the legislative and 
executive process. It would make corruption and the appearance of corruption more 
visible and encourage most public officials to adhere to higher standards. Currently, 
public employees and officials in Illinois at the state level file Statements of Economic 
Interest with the Illinois Secretary of State. Officials at the local level file with the County 
Clerk. These statements are in a format that is not searchable, the questions are far 
from probing, and they are not audited or examined for accuracy. Lobbyists are required 
to register with the Secretary of State and file expenditure reports. These reports tell us 
something, but we need to ask much better questions to get the kind of detailed, 
comprehensive information necessary to provide the meaningful transparency 
necessary to make sense of what is happening in Springfield. All state agency contracts 
between state government and private entities and all property leases between private 
entities and the state are filed with the Comptroller’s office. Some budget and 
expenditure information is on-line, some is not. The amount of information we have and 
the detail could be expanded. The Open Meetings Act could be more completely 
understood and more uniformly enforced. The battle to keep hard fought gains and 
achieve new ones in implementing and enforcing the Illinois’ Freedom of Information Act 
is a constant struggle.  
Transparency through reporting and disclosure casts sunshine on the political 
process. In some cases, it exposes real or potential conflicts of interest. In others, it 
provides verification that no conflicts exist. Just as importantly, the fear of disclosure 
discourages actions and relationships that cannot stand the light of day.  
Information is only as meaningful as its context. Data dumping or flooding the 
public with information which is not searchable or relevant can make it more difficult for 
the public to sort through information and draw realistic conclusions. There is a strong 
need to integrate this data and provide timely and complete access to that information. 
Once-a-year reports, paper reports, and reports posted on line in PDF files are certainly 
better than not having reports. Having information in a number of databases is better 
than not having information in a database at all. But, given the prevalence of electronic 
documents and database software, requiring electronic filing and semi-annual updates 
for statements of economic interest is not unreasonable. Neither is requiring all filings by 
registered lobbyists be in digital form.  In addition to increasing transparency, this would 
be the most cost-effective way for the state to administer records. This would parallel 
the requirement that comprehensive campaign disclosure reports be filed electronically 
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every three months. All of this information should be accessible online in searchable 
databases. The next step would be to bring all of the information about economic 
interests, lobbying activities and registration, campaign contributions and expenditures, 
and state contracts and property leases together in one integrated database that is 
searchable on-line. 
 How to deal with threats to the engagement of citizens in politics and their belief 
in the legitimacy of the political process has become more problematic in the current 
environment.  Numerous policy options have been tried to deal with corruption and the 
results have been limited. At the same time, the policy solutions that might best mitigate 
the impact of big money on politics have been eliminated or severely compromised by 
recent rulings by the US Supreme Court. While the task may be more difficult, the goals 
have not changed. The goal of political reform is still to strengthen citizen confidence in 
the legitimacy of their participation by preventing or exposing corruption and conflicts of 
interest. The goal of political reform is still reducing the negative influence of big money 
on citizen participation and citizen satisfaction in both elections and public policy 
making. The challenge is translating these goals into a message and an action agenda 
that can achieve success. 
 In order to win on the issue of money in politics, we first have to stop losing.  With 
the explosion of independent expenditures and the increasing willingness of those who 
control concentrated wealth at the individual and corporate entity level to engage in 
electoral politics, the idea that contribution limits can play an effective, even relevant 
role in elections will be called into question. There is no getting around the fact that 
limits play no constitutional role in regulating independent expenditures.  But 
contribution limits continue to have a strong role to play in elections in terms of limiting 
corruption and the appearance of corruption.  In addition, framing a discussion of 
contribution limits in terms of their impact on elections only deals with half of the 
equation.  A large portion of the money that flows into politics has nothing to do with 
elections and everything to do with policy. Groups with policy interests use money to 
build relationships and gain access to elected officials. Sometimes they will try to help 
legislators and candidates who are friendly to their cause by providing direct support in 
their elections. But most of the time these interests use campaign contributions to gain 
favor with whoever is in power. Limits on direct, truly uncoordinated contributions are 
effective in terms of the policy process. They limit corruption, limit opportunities for 
corruption and limit the appearance of corruption. The same logic applies to limits on 
contributions to candidates from legislative leaders and political parties. The idea that 
corruption or the appearance of corruption cannot occur in transactions between 
candidates and legislative leaders or political parties is a polite fiction that flies in the 
face of reality and common sense. Limits need to be defended and advanced for what 
they can do, rather than diminished or eliminated for what they do not do. 
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 It is time to go on the offensive by calling for the prohibition of direct contributions 
by corporate entities in Illinois. The principle that only people vote and so only people 
should contribute directly to political campaigns has existed at the federal level for more 
than 60 years. It is a sound principle that should be adopted in Illinois. Corporations, 
labor unions or associations as corporate entities cannot contribute directly to federal 
candidates. With the exception of the 2008 pay-to-play law, Illinois is one of the few 
states with no prohibitions on who or what can contribute to campaigns. Even if the 
philosophical argument were not so compelling, the practical impact on corruption and 
the appearance of corruption from adopting a prohibition on direct contributions to 
candidates and political parties from corporate entities makes it well worth doing. If 
companies seeking state contracts cannot contribute to public officials and if public 
officials cannot solicit companies that want or have state contracts, then both the 
appearance of quid pro quos and actual quid pro quos will no longer exist. The same 
logic applies to prohibitions on contributions from labor unions, corporations, or 
associations seeking changes in Illinois law. Individuals could still make contributions, 
but contribution limits and individual, rather than collective, responsibility for illegal 
actions would reduce the temptations and opportunities for individuals and public 
officials to engage in corrupt activities.  
 The McComish decision, which struck down a provision in Arizona’s citizen-
enacted public financing system to provide candidates an incentive to participate and 
the resources to ensure their campaigns could be plausible, may well limit the 
effectiveness of comprehensive public financing systems for political campaigns, but 
public financing can still play a positive role in Illinois elections.  Modest public financing 
grants would expand the number of candidates who run in the primaries and the 
number of candidates who remain viable in the general election. Resources given 
equally to all candidates are of greater values to challengers than to incumbents and of 
greater value to underfunded candidates.  The critical need for full public financing is in 
judicial elections. If we are going to continue to elect judges in Illinois, we need to adopt 
a system of robust public financing that replaces private money with public money in 
judicial campaigns to the fullest extent possible. This will not stop independent 
expenditures, but it will mitigate the appearance of corruption that comes from judicial 
elections that are proxy wars between trial lawyers and insurance companies or 
contests where all the candidates are generously supported by the same high profile 
law firms. When it comes to maintaining the legitimacy of our judicial system, 
appearances do matter. 
 There is another option for limiting the impact of big money in politics. Leveling 
the playing field by adding public money and limiting private money in elections has 
become very a problematic goal under recent Supreme Court decisions. Leveling the 
playing field by adding more private money from small donors may be a more useful 
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approach to achieving the goals of campaign finance reform. Michael Malbin of the 
Campaign Finance Institute has done extensive research to develop the idea that 
encouraging small donations through tax credits and rebates and facilitating those 
donations by online and text message technology has the potential for matching the 
impact of big donors and big independent expenditures. New York City has instituted an 
innovative small donor matching system for municipal elections that has produced 
promising results. Consideration is currently being given to expanding the model to New 
York state elections. Small donor systems fight the distorting and corrupting effect of big 
money on elections and policy making by giving candidates alternative sources of 
funding, thereby diminishing the influence of big donors, if not eliminating those donors 
altogether. They also increase public participation. Individuals giving a modest amount 
of money to candidates is a good thing when it engages more people in politics and 
gives them a sense of involvement and commitment.xxxix 
 Disclosure is the one aspect of campaign finance reform where recent US 
Supreme Court decisions have strengthened its constitutional status. Disclosure will 
carry a dual burden in the struggle to mitigate the role of money in politics in the post-
Citizens United era. A system of campaign finance disclosure which provides online, 
searchable access to comprehensive data on contributions and expenditures in as close 
to a real-time basis as possible improves the quality of citizen participation in elections 
and public policy making. Such disclosures enable citizens to know who is providing 
financial support for campaigns before they cast their ballots. They know who has 
contributed to an elected official prior to a legislative role call or a Governor’s decision to 
sign or veto a bill. Comprehensive timely disclosure provides incentives for candidates 
and public officials to modify their behavior to avoid actions that would give ammunition 
to an opponent, raise concerns with their constituents, or embarrass their mother. With 
the implementation of the changes made by the 2009 campaign finance law Illinois has 
one of the best disclosure systems in the country for direct contributions and candidate 
expenditures.  
 The real challenge for disclosure is getting at the sources of funding for groups 
making independent expenditures. Federal or state law cannot limit independent 
expenditures, but the sources that fund them do not have to be anonymous. It is both 
constitutional and good public policy to require that the sources of funds be disclosed. 
The 2009 law provides a very comprehensive and aggressive set of disclosure 
requirements for groups and individuals making independent expenditures in Illinois 
elections. It also provides a very broad, rigorous definition of independent expenditures. 
It is far superior to what is in place at the federal level. While this system looks good on 
paper, it is largely untested. The law took effect January 1, 2011. So far only local 
government elections including those for the city council and mayor in Chicago have 
been conducted under the new law. In that election a group called For a Better Chicago 
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moved $855,000 from their non-profit organization to their state PAC to support their 
endorsed candidates, but then refused to disclose their donors. The Illinois State Board 
of Elections upheld the move because it occurred three days prior the date the new 
disclosure requirements took effect. 
 The greatest fear is that, just like at the federal level, groups making huge 
independent expenditures in Illinois elections will claim to be not-for profit, tax-exempt 
educational or public policy groups whose donors are exempt from disclosure 
requirements. “Dark money” is the term that has been coined to describe the 
anonymous money that is funding independent expenditure ads in the 2012 presidential 
and congressional elections. It remains to be seen whether the requirements in place in 
Illinois will be effective in minimizing the role of dark money in state campaigns. How 
vigorous the State Board of Elections is in its interpretation and enforcement of the new 
law will be a critical factor.  
 Direct contributions can be limited by law and self-regulated through disclosure 
requirements. Independent expenditures cannot be limited by law. There can be no self-
regulation if their sources of funding are anonymous. Secretly funded independent 
expenditures are completely unrestrained and unconnected to dynamics of democratic 
self-government. Here, we need to be clear. The only reason people want to contribute 
money anonymously to influence elections is because they are cowards or because 
they have something to hide. The principles of democratic self-government require civic 
courage and civic honesty. 
 Finally, we need to raise the public expectations about politics held by Illinois 
politicians and citizens if we are to reject the politics of personal and private interests 
and create a politics of the public interest and the common good. Changing Illinois’ 
political culture has to start at the top. Elected officials at all levels of government have 
to take political ethics seriously and lead by example. Leading by example means that 
elected officials need to make clear that being a contributor, associate, or supporter of 
theirs is  not an advantage when it comes to getting jobs, contracts or political favors. 
An even better standard would be for it to be a disadvantage. Leading by example 
means that public employment is about bringing the best and the brightest into state 
government, not rewarding supporters regardless of qualifications. Leading by example 
means providing high quality services and meeting the state’s obligations rather than 
putting contributors’ interests before the public interest. Each person in a position of 
public responsibility must consider the message being sent to the citizens of the state 
by his or her actions.  
 It also means the public officials have to take collective ownership of the integrity 
of political institutions and the political process. Neither chamber of the Illinois state 
legislature has adopted a written code of ethics for its members and employees or 
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created a standing ethics committee to enforce it. The 1967 state ethics statue does 
contain a set of standards, but they are permissive and unenforceable. In 2010, when a 
state senator questioned the ethics of a colleague for sponsoring a bill that advanced 
the interests of one of his registered lobbyist father’s client, there was no code of ethics 
or ethics committee to deal with the issue. When the two legislators took up the issue on 
the senate floor in a heated discussion that lead to physical contact, there was no code 
of ethics or ethics committee to deal with that either. Nor was there any institutional 
mechanism to deal with another state senator trying to use her official position to 
interfere with a law enforcement response to a domestic dispute. The response in 2012 
to a state representative being indicted for taking a bribe was to form an ad hoc 
committee because no standing ethics committee was in place in the House. There 
needs to be an institutional, collective commitment by the legislature to ethics. Instead, 
ethical issues that do not rise to the level of criminality or criminal acts that do not 
become a huge political embarrassment for the legislature are ignored until they are 
forgotten or  the legal process provides a resolution or they go away. This stands in 
stark contrast to the US Congress, where the collective membership and the legislative 
leaders have made a commitment to ethics with written codes of conduct and standing 
ethics committees charged with enforcing them.  
 Changing Illinois’ political culture has to include the public. Citizens have to 
expect more from their politicians and be willing to hold them accountable. One of the 
costs of public corruption has to be politicians paying a price at the polls for not 
changing business as usual in Illinois. But that will never happen if citizens are not 
engaged and participating in the process. The last two years have seen efforts in a 
number of states to place restriction on the most basic form of political participation – 
voting.  This kind of voter suppression has not been a serious issue in Illinois, but what 
is needed is an affirmative agenda. Streamlined voter registration, same day 
registration, and expanded early voting will facilitate and encourage more people to 
vote. Simplifying candidate petition requirements and lowering signature thresholds to 
get on the ballot would facilitate and encourage more people to run for office. Reforming 
the redistricting processes to provide rationality and continuity to legislative districts 
would help citizens to identify with their districts and their legislators. Engaged citizens 
who take ownership of the process are more likely to hold public officials to a higher 
standard.  
 Indicting and convicting the bad guys is necessary. Changing laws to make 
corruption or the appearance corruption more difficult is necessary. Regulating the role 
of money in politics through limits, prohibitions, and disclosure is also necessary. But 
these changes are not enough. Long-term change in the nature of Illinois politics has to 
come from changes in the hearts and minds of Illinois citizens and Illinois politicians.  
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Appendix A 
Timeline -Significant Reform Breakthroughs 
 
Reform Description Statutory Cite Passed 
when? 
Electronic Filing Campaign disclosure 
reports are filed 
electronically and 
posted on-line 
10 ILCS 5/9-28 1998 
Occupation and 
employer 
disclosure 
PACs must list the 
occupation and 
employer of donors of 
more than $500 
10 ILCS 5/9-11(4) 1998 
Electioneering 
Communication 
Groups that run ads 
that mention the 
name of a candidate 
in the weeks before 
an election must 
disclose the source of 
funds that paid for the 
communication 
10 ILCS 5/9-1.14 
 
10 ILCS 5/9-1.4 (1.5) 
2003 
Disclosure in 
Political 
Communication 
PACs that pay for 
communications must 
include their name at 
the payor in mailings, 
telephone calls, 
websites, and other 
messages 
10 ILCS 5/9-9.5 2003 
Non-Profit 
Disclosure 
Non-profits that give 
to PACs must 
disclose the source of 
the funds given to 
PACs 
10 ILCS 5/9-7.5 2005 
Definition of Vote Clarification for 10 ILCS 5/24A-22 2005 
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recount purposes 
Paper Trail Requires DRE voting 
machines to provide 
paper trail for election 
audit purposes 
10 ILCS 5/24C-1 2004 
2005 
College 
Registration 
Registration materials 
must be distributed to 
college students 
10 ILCS 5/1A-17 2005 
On-Line Voters 
Guide 
State Board of 
Elections will post to 
the Internet a voter’s 
guide for statewide 
and appellate judicial 
candidates 
10 ILCS 5/12A 2005 
Liberalized 
Registration 
Registration closes at 
14 days rather than 
30 days 
10 ILCS 5/12A 2005 
Liberalized 
absentee voting 
No excuse absentee 
voting allowed 
10 ILCS 5/12A 2005 
On-line posting of 
Statements of 
Economic Interest 
The Secretary of 
State must post pdfs 
of all statements of 
economic interest 
5 ILCS 420-4A-106 2005 
Lobbyist 
Statements on-
line and 
searchable 
The Secretary of 
State is required to 
post lobbyist 
registrations in an on-
line, searchable 
database 
25 ILCS 170/7 2003 
Lobbyist 
Contingency Fees 
Banned 
Lobbyists barred from 
working on 
contingency for 
executive and 
administrative action 
(already applied to 
25 ILCS 170/8 2004 
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legislative lobbying) 
Ethics 
Commission 
Bipartisan 
commission to rule on 
ethics disputes 
5 ILCS 430/20-5 (Exec) 
5 ILCS 430/25-5 (Legis) 
2003 
Inspectors 
General 
Professional 
investigators for 
ethics disputes 
5 ILCS 430/20-10 
(Exec) 
5 ILCS 430/25-10 
(Legis) 
2003 
Ethics Training Mandatory for all 
state employees, 
annually 
5 ILCS 430/5-10 2003 
Gift Ban Prohibits gifts from 
contractors and 
others to public 
officials; limits gifts 
and meals from 
lobbyists 
5 ILCS 430/10 1998 
(revised 
2003) 
Political Activity on 
State Time 
Bans public 
employees from 
doing political work 
on taxpayer time; also 
applies to local 
governments 
5 ILCS 430/5-15 2003 
Ban on Personal 
Use of Campaign 
Funds 
Bars candidates from 
giving campaign 
funds to themselves 
or their relatives 
except for services 
rendered 
10 ILCS 5/9-8.10 1998 
(revised 
2003) 
State Property 
Ban 
Bans PACs from 
soliciting or receiving 
contributions on state 
property 
5 ILCS 430/5-35 
10 ILCS 5/9-8.10 
1998 
(revised 
2003) 
Session Day Barred in Sangamon 5 ILCS 430/5-40 1998 
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Fundraisers County on days when 
the Legislature is in 
Session, from 
February 1 through 
adjournment 
10 ILCS 5/9-27.5 (revised 
2003) 
Offer or Promise Candidates barred 
from offering or 
promising any state 
action in connection 
with the solicitation of 
a campaign 
contribution 
5 ILCS 430/5-30 2003 
Ban on Pay to 
Play 
Prohibits state 
officers, employees 
and spouses from 
profiting from state 
contract and bond 
deals.  Requires 
bidders to disclose 
their political 
contributions. Bans 
contractors with state 
business valued over 
$50,000 from giving 
to the officials who 
oversee their 
contracts, or to 
candidates for that 
office. 
10 ILCS 5/9-35 2008 
Campaign 
Contribution Limits 
Restricts individual 
contributions to no 
more than $5,000 to 
any candidate in an 
election cycle; 
businesses, labor 
unions and 
associations to 
$10,000 in 
10 ILCS 5/9-8.5 2009 
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contributions to 
candidates; and 
political action 
committees to no 
more than $50,000 
per candidate. 
FOIA Reform Streamlining of 
procedures and 
establishment of 
public access 
coordinators, 
elimination of some 
exemptions 
5ILCS 140/S 2010 
Quarterly   
campaign 
Disclosure 
 10 ILCS 5/9-10 (11) 2009 
Campaign Fund 
Audits 
Audits of the finances 
of political 
committees selected 
at random by the 
State Board of 
Elections to check 
compliance with state 
laws. 
10 ILCS 5/9-13 2009 
Real Time 
Reporting 
Mandates prompt 
disclosure of all 
contributions of 
$1,000 or more year 
round 
10 ILCS 5/9 -10 (11) 2009 
SBE Precedents Created searchable 
database of 
campaign violations 
and penalties. 
10 ILCS 5/9 23.5 2009 
Transfer limits on 
Political Parties 
Political parties are 
limited to $25,000 
transfers in the 
10 ILCS 5/9-8.5 2009 
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primary; there is no 
limit in the general 
election 
Independent 
Expenditures 
Robust definition and 
required reporting 
10 ILCS 5/9-1.15 (8.6) 2009 
Revolving Door 
Prohibitions 
State officers , 
employees, their 
spouses and 
immediate family 
members are 
prohibited from 
accepting 
compensation for one 
year from any person 
or company directly 
affected by certain 
decisions made when 
they: 
participated 
"personally 
and 
substantially in 
the decision to 
award State 
contracts with 
a cumulative 
value of over 
$25,000"; or 
made regulatory or 
licensing decisions. 
5 ILCS 430/5-45 2012 
Increased 
Lobbying 
Reporting 
Semi-monthly and 
more detailed reports 
required 
25 ILCS 170/11 2011 
Elimination of 
legislative 
scholarships 
 PA 97-0772 2012 
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Voting Rights Act   Sets forth redistricting 
criteria  
10 ILCS 120 2011 
Redistricting 
Transparency and 
Participation 
Sets forth future 
modest transparency 
and public 
participation criteria 
10 ILCS 125 2011 
Lobbying 
Enforcement 
SOS IG mandated to 
enforce lobbyist act  
25 ILCS 170/11 2011 
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Appendix B – 2003 Ethics Act 
The 2003 Governmental Ethics Legislation: 
 
• Creates strong, binding Ethics Commissions for the Executive and Legislative 
Branches, which set standards for ethics training and hear complaints on ethics 
violations; 
• Establishes five Executive and one Legislative Branch Inspectors General with 
subpoena powers to investigate complaints; 
• Mandates Ethics training for all state employees; 
• Prohibits political activity on state time including working on campaigns, soliciting 
or making political contributions and preparing or distributing campaign materials; 
• Bans most lobbyist gifts including golf and tennis outings; 
• Shuts revolving door for one year after leaving state employment for those 
materially involved in negotiating contracts in excess of $25,000; 
• Bans statewide and legislative officers from appearing in state funded public 
service announcements; 
• Expands whistleblower protections; 
• Restricts state contractors and lobbyists from serving on most boards and 
commissions; 
• Creates on-line electronic databases of lobbyist registration and gift reports; 
• Requires disclosure of ex parte communication in rule making; 
• Requires on-line posting of statements of economic interest; 
• Requires financial disclosure by sponsors of issue ads featuring candidates in 
the period immediately before an election; 
• Imposes stiff fines for political committees that fail to report funds received right 
before an election; 
• Bans the use of state-printed mailings to supplement election campaigns; and 
• Limits late-term gubernatorial appointments. 
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Appendix C 
 
2008 Pay-to-Play Law (PA-95-0971) 
 
Issue Area  
Bidders 
 
Bids Affected Bids from companies whose aggregate bids or 
contracts with state agencies exceed $50,000 
Disclosure of 
Contributions 
from Bidders 
Companies whose aggregate bids or contracts 
with state agencies exceed $50,000 must register 
with the State Board of Elections.  This 
registration must include the names of 
corporations with contracts, affiliated entities 
(parent, subsidiary, or sibling corporations; related 
PACs and non-profits), and affiliated 
persons(executive employees, owners of 7.5% of 
the company or more, or their spouses or minor 
children).  This registration must be keep up to 
date.  All disclosure reports from all political 
committees filed with the State Board of Elections 
will flag donations that come from contractors. 
Restriction on 
Giving During 
Pendency of 
Bid  
BANNED from the bidder, affiliated entities and 
affiliated persons to the officer who oversees the 
contract or candidates for that office.  
Contractors Disclose of 
Contributions 
from 
Contractors 
Companies whose aggregate contracts with state 
agencies exceed $50,000 must register with the 
State Board of Elections.  This registration must 
include the names of corporations with contracts, 
affiliated entities, and affiliated persons.  This 
registration must be keep up to date. All 
disclosure reports from all political committees 
filed with the State Board of Elections will flag 
donations that come from contractors. 
Restrictions 
on 
Contributions 
from 
BANNED from the bidder, affiliated entities, and 
affiliated persons (executive employees, owners 
of 7.5% of the company or more, or their spouses 
or minor children) to the officer who oversees the 
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Contractors contract for longer of term of office or length of 
contract plus two years 
Penalties Bidders and 
Contractors 
Contracts are voidable if the bidder or contractor 
fails to keep their registration with the State Board 
of Elections current, or if they make a contribution.  
Three violations in a three-year period 
automatically voids their contracts, and they may 
not bid for three years. 
Candidates 
and Political 
Committees 
Payments received by candidates and committees 
in violation of this law result in a fine equal in 
amount to the unlawful contribution. 
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Appendix D 
Comparison of competing limits provisions in 2009 effort to establish contribution limits 
Federal law: 
• Individuals can contribute $2,400 to a candidate committee during an election 
period. Individuals can contribute $5,000 to political committees and $28,500 to a 
national party committee during a calendar year. 
• Businesses, unions and associations are prohibited from contributing directly to 
candidates from their treasuries. (They may form political committees.) 
• Multi-candidate political candidate committees can contribute $5,000 to a 
candidate or other political committee during an election period, and $15,000 to a 
national party committee during a calendar year.  
• National party committees can contribute $5,000 to a candidate committee during 
an election period. State, district and local party committees can contribute an 
aggregate $5,000 to a candidate during an election period. 
HB 24, ICPR’s limits legislation: 
• Individuals could contribute $2,400 to a candidate, political party or legislative 
caucus committee, during an election period. Individuals could contribute $2,400 
to other political committees, and $80,000 in total/aggregate contribution, during 
a two-year period. 
• Businesses, unions and associations could contribute $5,000 to a candidate and 
$5,000 to a party, legislative caucus or other committee during an election 
period. Businesses, unions and associations would be bound by an $80,000 
aggregate contribution cap during a two-year period. 
• All other committees could contribute $5,000 to a local, legislative, judicial or 
statewide office candidate, during an election period. 
• State political parties could contribute $30,000 to a legislative candidate during 
the general election period; parties would be prohibited from contributing to 
candidates during the primary period. One political party committee, as 
designated by the candidate, could contribute $10,000 (if a local or judicial 
candidate), or $125,000 (if a statewide office candidate), during the general 
election period. 
HB 7, vetoed legislative proposal: 
• Individuals can contribute $5,000 to a candidate committee, $10,000 to a multi-
candidate committee, $10,000 to a non-candidate committee, and $5,000 to an 
elected official’s constituent services committee during a calendar year. 
• Businesses, unions and associations can contribute $10,000 to a candidate, 
$20,000 to a multi-candidate committee (including caucus and party committees), 
$20,000 to a non-candidate committee, and $5,000 to a constituent services 
committee during a calendar year. 
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